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Independent Orbiter Assessment
Analysis of the Manned Maneuvering Unit
1.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company (MDAC) was selected in
June 1986 to perform an Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of
the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items
List (CIL). Direction was given by the STS Orbiter and GFE
Projects Office to perform £_e hardware analysis using _he
instructions and ground rules defined in NSTS 22206, Instructions
for Preparation of FMEA and CIL, i0 October 1986. The IOA
a-_roac_ feature_ "a o_- o_n a--_l_is of the-_dware to
determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical
items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished
without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA
FMEA/CIL documentation. This report documents (Appendix C) the
independent analysis results corresponding to the Manned
Maneuvering Unit (MMU) hardware.
The MMU is a propulsive backpack, operated through separate hand
controllers that input the pilot's translational and rotational
maneuvering commands to the control electronics and then to the
thrusters. Twenty-four thrusters on the unit provide the
astronaut with slx-degree-of-freedom maneuvering control
capability. Dual electrical/power and propulsion systems have
been designed into the MMU to optimize astronaut return to the
Orbiter. Throughout the duration of its mission, the MMU
performs propulsion, control, system maintenance and stowage and
crewmember restralnt/fit functions. MMU hardware employed to
perform these functions comprise the following:
o Propulsion Subsystem
o Electrical/Power Subsystem
o Support Structures and Mechanisms
o Flight Support Station
The IOA analysis process utilized available MMU hardware drawings
and schematics for defining hardware subsystems, assemblies,
components, and hardware items. Final levels of detail were
evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects.
Criticality was assigned based upon the worst case severity of
the effect for each identified failure mode.
Figure 1 presents a summary of the failure criticalities for each
of the four major subdivisions of the MMU. A summary of the
number of failure modes, by criticality, is also presented below
with Hardware (HW) criticality first and Functional (F)
criticality second.
_3
ISummary of IOA Failure Modes By Criticality (HW/F)
Criticality: I i/i I 2/IRNumber : 5 37 2/225 I 3/IR3 3/2R 1 3/325 41
TOTAL
136
m
m
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For each failure mode identified, the criticality and redundancy
screens were examined to identify Potential Critical Items
(PCIs). A summary of PCIs is presented as follows:
Summary of IOA Potential Critical Items (HW/F)
NumberCriticality:Ii/l: 5 2/IR37 2/2 13/IR25 - 3/2RITOTAL2 69
m
u
In s_ary, the IOA analysis Of the MMU has found that the
majority of the PCIs identified are resultant from the loss of
either the propulsion or control functions, or are resultant from
inability to perform an immediate or future mission. The five
most severe criticalities identified are all resultant from
failures imposed on the MMU hand controllers which have no
redundancy within the MMU .......
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Figure 1 - MMU OVERVIEW ANALYSIS SUMMARY
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2.0 INTRODUCTION
2.1 Purpose
The 51-L Challenger accident prompted the NASA to readdress
safety policies, concepts, and rationale being used in the
National Space Transportation System (NSTS). The NSTS Office has
undertaken the task of reevaluating the FMEA/CIL for the Space
Shuttle design. The MDAC is providing an independent assessment
of the Orbiter and Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) FMEA/CIL
for completeness and technical accuracy. J
2.2 Scope
The scope of the independent FMEA/CIL assessment activity
encompasses those Shuttle Orbiter subsystems and GFE hardware
identified in the Space Shuttle Independent FMEA/CIL Assessment
Contractor Statement of Work. Each subsystem analysis addresses
hardware, functions, internal and external interfaces, and
operational requirements for all mission phases.
J
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2.3 Analysis Approach
The independent analysis approach is a top-down analysis
utilizing as-built drawings to breakdown the respective subsystem
into components and low-level hardware items. Each hardware item
is evaluated for failure mode, effects, and criticality. These
data are documented in the respective subsystem analysis report,
and are used to assess the NASA and Prime Contractor FMEA/CIL
reevaluation results. The IOA analysis approach is summarized in
the following Steps 1.0 through 3.0. Step 4.0 summarizes the
assessment of the NASA and Prime Contractor FMEAs/CILs that is
performed and documented at a later date.
I
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Step 1.0 Subsystem familiarization
i.I Define subsystem functions _
1.2 Define subsystem components
1.3 Define subsystem specific ground rules and
assumptions ....
Step 2.0 Define subsystem analysis diagram
2.1 Define subsystem
2.2 Define major assemblies
2.3 Develop detailed subsystem representations
Step 3.0 Fa-ilure events definition
3.1 Construct matrix of failure modes
3.2 Document IOA analysis results
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Step 4.0 Compare IOA analysis data to NASA FMEA/CIL
4.1 Resolve differences
4.2 Review in-house
4.3 Document assessment issues
4.4 Forward findings to Project Manager
2.4 MMU Ground Rules and Assumptions
Due to the unique functions performed by the MMU, the IOA project
determined it necessary to establish groundrules and assumptions
applicable solely to the MMU (reference Appendix B). These
ground rules and assumptions, in addition to those established
project wide (also provided in Appendix B), are intended to both
complement and supplement those defined in NSTS 22206.
Additional, they ensure that the IOA MMU analysis is capable of
being understood by personnel who did not directly participate in
the analysis.
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3.0 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
3.1 Design and Function
The MMU, reference Figure 2, is a modular, self-contained,
propulsive backpack designed to attach to the Extravehicular
Mobility Unit (EMU) and to be donned and doffed by one unassisted
crewmember. When used, the MMU increases the Orbiter crew's
Extravehicular Activcity (EVA) mobility by extending the range of
their activities from the payload bay to other portions of the
spacecraft, to appendages of payloads protruding from the cargo
bay, or to other spacecraft entirely. When not in use, the MMU
is stowed in the forward payload bay on the Flight Support
Station (FSS), reference Figure 3. Two MMUs are typically flown
on each Orbiter missi0n.
The IOA analysis has defined the MMU as being comprised of a
propulsion subsystem, electrical/power subsystem, support
structures and mechanisms, and the FSS. These subsystems and
hardware can operate singly or in an integrated manner to perform
four primary functions: propulsion, control, system maintenance
and stowage, and crewmember restraint/fit.
i • Propulsion Subsystem - Two independent, identical subsystems
are each capable of providing the translational and
rotational forces necessary for propulsion. Inert GN2
propellant is stored in two pressure vessels. Activation
of a motor-driven isolation valve (open) allows GN2 to flow
to a pressure regulator and then to the thruster manifolds
which consist of four 3-thruster (triad) assemblies for each
of the two subsystems. Based on hand-controller and gyro
inputs, electrical power to the thruster solenoid valves
result in expansion of the nitrogen gas through a nozzle to
produce propulsion• The two systems are isolated but can be
interconnected through hand-actuated toggle valves. Quick-
disconnect valves provide GN2 recharge capability for the
pressure vessels when the MMU is stowed in the FSS. Figure
4 is a schematic of the propulsion subsystem.
. Electrical/Power Subsystem - Encompasses the control
electronics and the power storage and distribution within
the MMU. Figure 5 presents an overview of this subsystem.
The maneuvering control comprises three main elements - two
hand controllers and the Control Electronics Assembly (CEA).
These operate together to provide signals to the propulsion
system for rotational or translational motion. The
Rotational Hand Controller (RHC) furnishes switching logic
that converts rotary motions of the handle to rotational
commands. The RHC also supplies control for the attitude
hold function• The Translational Hand Controller (THC)
provides switching logic that converts the motions of the
handle in three axes to translational commands. The THC
also controls the propellant isolation valve.
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Figure 2 - MANNED MANEUVERING UNIT (MMU)
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Figure 4 - PROPULSION SUBSYSTEM SCHEMATIC
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Figure 5 _ ELECTRICAL/POWER SUBSYSTEM OVERVIEW
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The CEA contains circuitry to operate the thruster valves of
the propulsion system, and circuitry to respond to hand-
controller commands for translational and rotational
control• Gyro circuitry provides attitude and rate
information. Phase-plane circuitry furnishes inputs for the
thruster select logic for the automatic attitude hold mode
of operation.
The thruster select logic uses either or both redundant
thruster sets to convert manual and/or attitude hold
commands to thrust commands. Valve drive amplifiers amplify
the thruster valve signals to levels required for valve
operation. Isolation valves, when open, allow GN2 to flow
from the pressure vessels to the pressure regulators.
Thruster cue lights allow a visible indication of thruster
commands and isolation valve operation•
The power comprises two silver-zinc batteries and two separate
power distribution systems that include the circuit
breakers, switches, and relays required for MMU operation.
Power conditioners in the CEA, fed from the batteries,
supply power to the CEA and hand controllers. Locator
lights provide visible indication of the location of the EVA
crewmember to an observing crewmember inside the Orbiter.
The locator lights consist of a converter assembly and three
light assemblies. The batteries also furnish heater power
for the propulsion heaters and handcontroller case heaters.
Heaters are required for both orbital storage and EVA
operations• During EVA, skin temperatures can be as low as
-120 degrees F, whereas most components must be above -60
degrees F for operation•
Support Structures and Mechanisms - The basic MMU structure
consists of two side towers connected by the center struc-
ture and two arms. The towers support the thrusters and
provide mounting for the MMU/FSS retention latches and the
propulsion subsystem Quick Disconnects (QDs). The center
structure supports the two batteries, eight circuit
breakers, the CEA, two pressure vessels, and propulsion
equipment. Also supported are the external power connector,
and thermal cover, and the thermal covers for the batteries.
In conjunction with the towers, the center structure
supports the retention system for the EMU. This EMU/MMU
retention system consists of two independent manually
activated latches, guide ramps, and back-support p61nts.
The arms can be pivoted and extended for flight or located
in the stowed position.
ii
. Flight Support Station (FSS) - The FSS, reference Figure 3,
provides MMU stowage, GN2 pressure vessel recharge, and
stowage heaters for the MMU on the port or starboard side of
the Orbiter near the EVA airlock and hatch .....
The FSS structure comprises the side arms, foot restraints,
and the Orbiter mounting structure. A locking handle and
butterfly latch are provided for flight docking, capture,
and release of the MMU. The foot restraints are adjustable
on orbit to accomodate the full range of astronaut
anthropometry. Shock mounts (viSra£ion isolators) are
provided to attenuate the Orbiter launch environment. The
MMU is secured in the FSS during launch with four capture
bolts and Gas Actuated Nuts (GANs) installed in the MMU.
On astronaut operation, the nuts wi_iac_uate and MMU bolts
release, allowing FSS egress. For contingency operations,
the nuts can be manually engaged or disengaged.
The pneumatic portion of the FSS consists of a dual Orbiter
interface which routes GN2 to redundant charging systems,
either one of which can recharge the MMU propulsion system.
Each charging system contains a charging valve, vent valve,
flex hose, and one-half of the QD. GN2 can also be supplied
to the GANs used for MMU-to-FSS launch attachment.
FSS heaters are supplied 28-vdc power from the Orbiter
through two independent power buses. Breakers in the
Orbiter cabin furnish circuit protection. Five temperature
sensors are provided for crew temperature monitoring of the
MMU during orbital storage.
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3.2 Interfaces and Locations
Interfaces occur between the MMU (including the FSS) and other
Space Transportation System (STS) Orbiter elements in three
specific areas. First, the MMU itself interfaces with the FSS.
Second, structural, mechanical, electrical, and nitrogen recharge
interfaces exist between the Orbiter and the FSS. Third,
mechanical and man/machine interfaces exist between the crew-
member in the EMU and the MMU.
when not in use the MMU is S£0wed in the front of the payload bay
of the Orbiter on the FSS. Due to this location the MMU is
continually exposed to the space environment when in orbit. The
EMU to MMU interfaces are depicted in Figure 6. The MMU to FSS
interfaces envelopes in the payload bay are depicted in Figures 7
and 8.
3.3 Hierarchy
Figures 9 through 13 illustrate the hierarchal relationships
between the MMU, subsystems, and components employed for the
enclosed IOA analysis.
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Figure l0 - PROPULSION SUBSYSTEM HIERARCHY
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4.0 ANALYSIS RESULTS
The IOA analysis of the MMUresulted in the identification of 136
failure modes (reference Appendix C) from which 69 PCls
(reference Appendix D) were derived. The summary distributions
of failure criticalities and their corresponding PCIs are
provided in Tables I and II respectively, _
m
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TABLE I Summary of IOA Failure Modes and Criticalities
Criticality:
propulsion
Electrical/
Power
Support
Structures &
Mechanisms
FSS
Z/1
5
2/IR
13
22
2
2/2
4
9
11
1
3/IR
1
3/2R
2
5
2
16
3/3
2
19
3
17
TOTAL
22
6O
18
36
TOTAL 37 25 3 25 41 136
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TABLE II Summary IOA of Potential Critical Items
Criticality:
Propulsion
Electrical/
Power
Support
Structures &
Mechanisms
FSS
TOTAL
]./Z
5
5
2/IR
13
22
2
37
212
4
9
11
25
3/IR
w
3/2R
1
2
TOTAL
17
36
14
2
69
+ ÷
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More detailed discussions of the above findings are presented in
the following paragraphs.
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4.1 Analysis Results - Propulsion
w
The MMU propulsion subsystem analysis identified twenty-two (22)
failure modes which could occur during a MMU mission. Of these
twenty-two failure modes, seventeen (17) were considered PCIs and
none were single point failures which could result in loss of
life or vehicle. All seventeen single point failure PCIs
resulted in mission impacts, and thirteen (13) of these could
cause loss of life or vehicle if a redundant MMU propulsion or
propulsion control function (typically by loss of a side) were
lost.
4.2 Analysis Results - Electrical/Power
Five (5) electrical/power single point failures have been
identified by the IOA; any one of which, if realized, can result
in loss of crewperson by failure of MMU propulsion control
capability.
An additional thirty-one (31) single point failure PCIs also
exist as possible mission impacts. Within these PCIs are twenty-
two (22) which, if analyzed in conjunction with redundant
function failures (frequently loss of other side's propulsion or
control functions), result in possible loss of the crewperson.
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4.3 Analysis Results - Support Structures and Mechanisms
The hardware encompassed by support structures and mechanisms
contains a total of eighteen (18) failure modes from which
fourteen (14) PCIs have been identified. Thirteen (13) of these
PCIs result in mission termination typically by failing the
crewperson restraint/fit function or by failing either MMU
mission preparation or consummables recharge. Additionally, two
(2) of these PCIs can result in loss of crewperson when their
redundant crewperson restraint function is failed. A remaining
PCI (MDAC ID 197) also exists which will be both an EMU and MMU
mission impact due to inability of the crewperson to release one
of the four PLSS-to-MMU latches thereby requiring ingress into
the Orbiter, via the airlock, with the MMU connected.
4.4 Analysis Results - FSS
Due to extensive redundancy and support functions, the FSS
contains only two PCIs. MDAC analysis ID 220 revealed a mission
impact due to inability of the MMU to be removed from the FSS,
whereas ID 222 identified potential mission impact due to
contamination causing component malfunction when redundant
filters are failed.
u
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APPENDIX A
ACRONYMS
- Automatic Attitude Hold
- Circuit Breaker
- Control Electronics Assembly
- Critical Items List
- Extravehicular Mobility Unit
- Extravehicular Activity
- Functional
- Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
- Failure Mode
- Flight Support Station
- Gas Actuated Nut
- Government Furnished Equipment
- Gaseous Nitrogen
- Haraware
- Hand Controller
- Hard Upper Torso
- Independent Orbiter Assessment
- In£ravehicular Activity
- Johnson Space Center
- Light Emitting Diode
- Lights
- McDonnell Douglas Astronautic Company
- Manned Maneuvering Unit
- National Space Transportation System
- Potential Critical Item
- Payload Bay
- Portable Life-Support System
- fQuick Disconnect
- Rotational Hand Controller
- Satellite Stabilization
- Solar Maximum Mission
- Space Operations Simulator
- Space Transportation System
- Thermal Control System
- Translational Hand Controller
- Trunnion Pin Attach Device
- Valve Drive Amplifier
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APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.I Definitions
Definitions contained in NSTS 22206, Instructions For Preparation
of FMEA/CIL, i0 October 1986, were used with the _6_lowing
a-mplifications and additoi-_.
INTACT ABORT DEFINITIONS:
RTLS - begins at transition to OPS 6 and ends at transition
_ OPS 9, post-flight
TAL - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
%--_nsition to OPS 9, post-flight
AOA - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
_-_nsition to OPS 9, post-flight
ATO - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
_-_nsition to OPS 9, post-flight
CREDIBLE (CAUSE) - an event that can be predicted or expected in
anticipated operational environmental conditions. Excludes an
event where multiple failures must first occur to result in
environmental extremes
CONTINGENCY CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard m--_function procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
EARLY MISSION TERMINATION - termination of onorbit phase prior to
p-l-_ed end of mission
EFFECTS/RATIONALE - description of the case which generated the
highest criticality
HIGHEST CRITICALITY - the highest functional criticality
determined in the phase-by-phase analysis
MAJOR MODE (MM) - major sub-mode of software operational sequence
MC - Memory Configuration of Primary Avionics Software System
(P---ASS)
MISSION - assigned performance of a specific Orbiter flight with
payload/objective accomplishments including orbit phasing and
altitude (excludes secondary payloads such as GAS cans,
middeck P/L, etc.)
B-2
MULTIPLE ORDER FAILURE - describes the failure due to a single
cause or event of all units which perform a necessary (critical)
function
OFF-NOMINAL CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard m--_function procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
OPS - software operational sequence
PRIMARY MISSION OBJECTIVES - worst case primary mission objec-
tives are equal to mission objectives
PHASE DEFINITIONS:
PRELAUNCH PHASE - begins at launch count-down Orbiter
power-up 'an-_ds at moding to OPS Major Mode 102 (liftoff)
LIFTOFF MISSION PHASE - begins at SRB ignition (MM 102) and
ends at transiti_-n out of OPS 1 (Synonymous with ASCENT)
ONORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS 2 or OPS 8 and
ends at _-ransition out of OPS 2 or OPS 8- -
DEORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS Major Mode
301 and _at first main landing g@ar touchdown
LANDING/SAFING PHASE - begins at first main gear
touchdown and ens--_ith the completion of post-landing
safing operations
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APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.2 IOA Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions
The philosophy embodied in NSTS 22206, Instructions for
Preparation of FMEA/CIL, I0 0--_ober 1986, was employe-_-with the
following amp--[ifications a-nd additiohs.
l •
•
•
•
The operational flight software is an accurate
implementation of the Flight System Software Requirements
(FSSRs).
RATIONALE: Software verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
After liftoff, any parameter which is monitored by system
management (SM) or which drives any part of the Caution and
Warning System (C&W) will support passage of Redundancy
Screen B for its corresponding hardware item.
RATIONALE: Analysis of on-board parameter availability
and/or the actual monitoring by the crew
is beyond the scope of this task.
Any data employed with flight software is assumed to be
functional for the specific vehicle and specific mission
being flown.
RATIONALE: Mission data verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
All hardware (including firmware) is manufactured and
assembled to the design specifications/drawings.
< tlJi_%
RATIONALE: Acceptance and verification testing is
designed to detect and identify problems
before the item is approved for use.
All Flight Data File crew procedures will be assumed
performed as written, and will not include human error in
hheir performance.
RATIONALE: Failures caused by human operational error
are out-of-scope of this task.
N
L_
i
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,•
•
•
i0.
ii.
All hardware analyses will, as a minimum, be performed at
the level of analysis existent within NASA/Prime Contractor
Orbiter FMEA/CILs, and will be permitted to go to greater
hardware detail levels but not lesser•
RATIONALE: Comparison of IOA analysis results with
other analyses requires that both analyses
be performed to a comparable level of
detail.
verification that a telemetry parameter is actually
monitored during AOS by ground-based personnel is not
required _..... _ ...............
RATIONALE: Analysis of mission-dependent telemetry
availability and/or the actual monitoring of
applicable data by ground-based personnel is
beyond the scope of this task.
The determination of criticalities per phase is based on the
worst case effect of a failure for the phase being analyzed.
The failure can occur in the phase being analyzed or in
any previous phase, whichever produces the worst case
effects for the phase of interest.. _ _ _
RATIONALE: Assigning phase criticalities ensures a
thorough and complete analysis•
Analysis of wire harnesses, cables and electrical connectors
to determine if FMEAs are warranted will not be performed
nor FMEAs assessed•
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection•
Analysis of welds or brazed Joints that cannot be inspected
will not be performed nor FMEAs assessed.
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection.
Emergency system or hardware will include burst discs and
will exclude the EMU Secondary Oxygen Pack (SOP), pressure
relief valves and the landing gear pyrotechnics,_ _
RATIONALE: Clarify definition of emergency systems to
ensure consistency throughout IOA project•
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B.3 MMU Ground Rules and Assumptions
i . Loss of the MMU's automatic attitude hold capability
will not be considered life or vehicle threatening, or
a mission impact•
Rationale: To date no normal or contingency MMU
operation has been identified or envisioned
which would require the automatic attitude
hold capability.
• The availability of the Orbiter to perform a rescue of
a stranded crewperson will not be considered in
determining the criticality of the applicable failure
mode.
Rationale: The IOA project believes such an exclusion
is necessary to ensure worst case scenario
analysis results in the most appropriate
criticality.
• For all analyses, it is assumed that the MMU may be
required for planned or contingency operations anytime
up to initiation of the Orbiter deorbit phase.
•
Rationale: The above assumption ensures that failures
occuring subsequent to a MMU mission are
analyzed for their effect on subsequent MMU
missions•
The following MMU flight phase definitions are
applicable for the analyses provided in Appendix C:
Pre-Ops: The timeframe extending from installation
in the Orbiter to removal of the MMU (on-
orbit) from the FSS
Ops: The on-orbit duration of time during which
the MMU is manned and not stowed in the FSS
Post-Ops: Any timeframe subsequent to on-orbit
stowage of the MMU and prior to Orbiter
mission completion
. Although two (2) MMUs are flown on each mission, criti-
cality assignment is performed without consideration to
the availability of the second MMU.
Rationale: The assignment of worst case criticality is
ensured by this assumption.
B-6
APPENDIX C
DETAILED ANALYSIS
m
This section contains the IOA analysis worksheets generated
during the analysis of this subsystem. The information on these
worksheets is intentionally similar to the NASA FMEAs. Each of
these sheets identifies the hardware item being analyzed, and
parent assembly, as well as the function. For each failure mode,
the possible causes are outlined, and the assessed hardware and
functional criticality for each mission phase is listed, as
described in the NSTS 22206, Instructions for Preparation of FMEA
and CIL, i0 October 1986. Finally, effects are entered at--the
5ottom of each sheet?-_d the worst case criticality is entered
at the top.
LEGEND FOR IOA ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS
wgwwml
Hardware Criticalities:
1 - Loss of life or vehicle
2 - Loss of mission or next failure of any redundant item
(like or unlike) could cause loss of life/vehicle
3 - All others
Functional Criticalities: _
IR - Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, cou!_dcause !oss of !ire or vehicle.
2R - Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of mission.
Redundancy Screen A:
1 = Is Checked Out PreFlight
2 = Is Capable of Check Out PreFlight
3 - Not Capable of Check Out PreFlight
NA - Not App!icable
Redundancy Screens B and C:
P - Passed Screen
F - Failed Screen
NA - Not Applicable
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DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
9/19/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MMU
i00 FLIGHT:
ITEM: GN2 TANK
FAILURE MODE: LEAK
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MMU
2) PROPULSION SUBSYSTEM
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: 2/IR
POST-OPS: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: SIDE A OR B
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: IMPACT, OVERWRAP SEPARATION (MANV.)
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSSOF PROPELLANT LEADING TO LOSS OF SIDE, PROPULSIVE
CAPABILITY. LOSS OF SECOND SIDE STRANDS CREWMEMBER IN FREE
SPACE. POSSIBLE PROPULSIVE VENTLEAD_ TO LOSS 0FCONTROL.
REFERENCES:
J
W
L_
REPORT DATE 11/22/86 C-2
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/19/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
suBsYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 102 FLIGHT: 3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TOGGLE VALVE
FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
I
g
mm
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MMU
2) PROPULSION SUBSYSTEM
3)
4)
S)
6)
v)
8) m
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC i
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: 3/2R
POST-OPS: 3/3 i
B[P] C[P]REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: SIDE A OR B
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION SEAT FAILURE/WEAR
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILED 0PENV_VE CAUSES LOgS OF TOTAL REDUNDANCY,_UT N_T_QF
NOMINAL OPERATIONAL OR MALFUNCTION REDUNDANCY. LOSS OF BOTH
VALVES DOES CAUSE LOSS OF PROPULSION SYSTEM REDUNDANCY AND
REQUIRES MISSION TERMINATION. -_- _ _
REFERENCES:
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DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER AssESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
9/19/86
MMU
103
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TOGGLE VALVE
FAIL CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) MMU
2) PROPULSION SUBSYSTEM
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHTPHASE .... HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: 3/3
POST-OPS: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: SIDE A OR B
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION ON SEAT, INLET OR OUTLET FILTER BLOCKED
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
i FAiLE_ CLOSE_ VASVE_R_S_S_E _ OF PROPELLANTOF FAILED SIDE IN
GOOD SIDE, BUT NORMAL SYSTEM REDUNDANCY PRESENT. FAILURE
PREVENTS RECHARGE SO POST EVA MISSION MAY BE JEOPORDIZED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/22/86 C-4
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/19/86
MMU
104
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ISOLATION VALVE
FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
1) M_U
2) PROPULSION SUBSYSTEM
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 2/2
OPS: 2/2
POST-OPS: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
SIDE A OR B
CAUSES: MECHANICAL FAILURE, ELECTRICAL SHORT/OPEN
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF DETECTED LOSS OF MISSION SINCE MMU MUST NOT BE FLOWN WITHOUT
ISOLATE CAPABILITY.
REFERENCES:
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DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
9/19/86
MMU
105
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ISOLATION VALVE
FAIL CLOSE
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MMU
2) PROPULSION SUBSYSTEM
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: 2/IR
POST-OPS: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: SIDE A OR B
PART NUMBER:
B [ F ] C [ F ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL FAILURE, ELECTRICAL SHORT/OPEN, INLET OR
OUTLET FILTER BLOCKED.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF SUBSYSTEM A ISOLATION VALVE FAILS CLOSED, THE GAS TANK ON THAT
SIDE IS SHUT OFF FROM THE THRUSTERS ON THAT SIDE. LOSS OF
FUNCTION OF THAT SIDE RESULTS. LOSS OF PROPULSION SUBSYSTEM
REDUNDANCY RESULTS, A MISSION RULE IS VIOLATED,
LOSS OF MISSION RESULTS. LOSS OF OTHER SIDE CAN RESULT IN
STRANDED CREWPERSON.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/22/86 C-6
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/19/86
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 106
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM: GN2 LINES
FAILURE MODE: LEAK
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MMU
2) PROPULSION SUBSYSTEM
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: 2/IR
POST-OPS: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: SIDE A OR B
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: MATERIAL FAILURE AT SEALS _/OR CONNECTORS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF L_ IS LARGE, ISOLATION VALVE WILL BE CLOSED IF GAS HAS NOT
ALL LEAKED OUT ALREADY. IN EITHER CASE, FUNCTION OF
CORRESPONDING PROPULSION SUBSYSTEM IS LOST AND THEREFORE
PROPULSION SUBSYSTEM REDUNDANCY IS LOST. THIS VIOLATES A MISSION
RULE
RESULTING IN MISSION TERMINATION. LOSS OF OTHER SIDE CAN RESULT
IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREWPERSON BY STRANDING.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE i1/22/86 C-7
l
m
U
I
i
l
m
m
mm
U
m
m
i
g
m
mm
i
I
m
g
m
ww
w
W
w
=--
w
m
m
w
t
w
W
i
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/19/86
MMU
ii0
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
T_USTER MANIFOLD
LEAK
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
1 ) MMU
2 ) PROPULSION SUBSYSTEM
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
_ITiCALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE .... HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: 2/IR
POST-OPS: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: SIDE A OR B
PART NUMBER:
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: MATERIAL FAILURE, SEAL FAILURE, THERMAL CYCLING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF LEAK IS _GE,-SiDE-iSOLATED,-CA_Iq_GLOSS OF SIDE. POSSIBLE
STRANDING OF CREWPERSON WITH LOSS OF OTHER-SIDE.
REFERENCES:
_J
E
REPORT DATE 11/22/86 C-8
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
9/19/86
MMU
iii
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
THRUSTER MANIFOLD
CONSTRICTION
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MMU
2) PROPULSION SUBSYSTEM
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: 2/IR
POST-OPS: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
SIDE A OR B
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, IMPACT, INLET FILTER BLOCKED
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF CONSTRI_!0N OBSTRUCTIVE ENOUGH, _M/tRKED LOSS OF THRUST
RESULTS, LEADS TO EFFECTIVE LOSS OF SIDE. POSSIBLE STRANDING OF
CREWMEMBER IF OTHER SIDE FAILS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/22/86 C-9
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/19/86
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 112
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
THRUSTER
FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) MMU
2) PROPULSION SUBSYSTEM
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: 2/IR
POST-OPS: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
SIDE A OR B
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, GALLING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CAUSES UNCOMMANDED ACCELERATION, LOSS OF SIDE. POSSIBLE STRANDING
OF CREWMEMBER IF OTHER SIDE FAILS.
REFERENCES:
m
w
L_
i
H
m
L
H
REPORT DATE 11/22/86 C-10
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/19/86
MMU
113
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
THRUSTER
FAIL CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) MMU
2) PROPULSION SUBSYSTEM
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: 2/IR
POST-OPS: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
SIDE A OR B
CAUSES: SHORT/OPEN CIRCUIT IN SOLENOID; CONTAMINATION, GALLING,
FILTER BLOCKED
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CAUSES UNCOMMANDED ACCELERATION, SLUGGISH RESPONSE. SIDE CAN BE
USED BUT IS PROBABLY BEST SHUT OFF. IF OTHER SIDE FAILS,
CREWPERSON CANNOT CONTROL MMU AND MAY BE STRANDED OR DRIVE INTO
OTHER OBJECT. _ _
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/19/86
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: i14
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM: THRUSTER
FAILURE MODE: LEAK
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MMU
2) PROPULSION SUBSYSTEM
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: 2/IR
POST-OPS: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
SIDE A OR B
CAUSES: MATERIAL FAILURE/FRACTURE, SEAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LARGE LEAK COULD CAUSE LOSS 0Y ALL GAS ON SIDE. IF BOTH SIDES ARE
LOST, POSSIBLE STRANDING OF_EWPER_0N_ ....
REFERENCES:
m
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REPORT DATE 11/22/86 C-12
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/19/86
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 116
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GN2 REGULATOR
FAIL CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MMU
2) PROPULSION SUBSYSTEM m
3)
4)
6)
7)
8) m
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: 2/IR
POST-OPS: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
SIDE A OR B
CAUSES: MATERIAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, SPRING FRACTURE, FILTER
BLOCKED
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REGULATOR FAILED CLOSED CAUSES LOSS OF SIDE. IF BOTH SIDES LOST,
POSSIBLE STRANDING OF CREWPERSON.
REFERENCES:
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DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
9/19/86
MMU
117
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GN2 REGULATOR
FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MMU
2) PROPULSION SUBSYSTEM
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 2/1R
OPS: 2/IR
P0ST-OPS: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
SIDE A OR B
CAUSES: SPRING FAILURE, MATERIAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REGULATOR FAILED OPEN CAUSES LOSS OF SIDE. IF RELIEF FAILS.
POSSIBLE "EXPLOSIVE" FAILURE DUE TO OVERPRESSURIZATION OF
MANIFOLD CAUSING HIGH VELOCITY SHRAPNEL, WHICH CAN CAUSE LOSS OF
CREWPERSON.
LOSS OF OTHER SIDE CAN STRAND CREWPERSON.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/22/86 C-14
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/19/86
MMU
119
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GN2 REGULATOR
FAIL LOW
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) MMU
2) PROPULSION SUBSYSTEM
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: 2/2
POST-OPS: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
SIDE A OR B
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, SPRING FAILURE, INCORRECT CAL.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SLUGGISH CONTROL RESPONSE. MISSION TERMINATION.
HDW/FUNC
2/2
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DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
9/19/86
MMU
120
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GN2 RELIEF VALVE
FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MMU
2) PROPULSION SUBSYSTEM
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: 2/IR
POST-OPS: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
SIDE A OR B
CAUSES: SPRING FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILED OPEN CAUSES LOSS OF ALL GAS UNLESS ISO. VALVE IS CLOSED.
MISSION TERMI_TIO_P0_SIBLE_ ....LOSS OF OTHER SIDE CAN RESULT IN
CREWPERSON BEING STRANDED.
REFERENCES:
=
i
REPORT DATE 11/22/86 C-16
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/19/86
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 121
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GN2 RELIEF VALVE
FAIL CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) MMU
2) PROPULSION SUBSYSTEM
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/IR
OPS: 3/IR
POST-OPS: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: SIDE A OR B
PART NUMBER:
B[P] c[P]
CAUSES: SPRING FAILURE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF REGULATOR FAIL__S QPE_ AND RELIEF VALVE ALSO FAILS CLOSED;
CAPABILITY TO REGULATE GAS PRESSURE AT THRUSTER _IFOLD IS LOST,
B
m
I
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m
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mm
RESULTING IN POSSIBLE EXPLOSION OF MANIFOLD, DAMAGE TO ORBITER,
OR LOSS OF CREWMEMBER.
REFERENCES:
mm
B
B
REPORT DATE 11/22/86 C-17
mw
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DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
9/19/86
MMU
122
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT :
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PRESSURE GAGE
LEAK
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) MMU
2) PROPULSION SUBSYSTEM
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLI_PT{ASE ..... HDW/FUNC
PRE-0PS: 3/3
OPS: 2/IR
POST-OPS: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: SIDE A OR B
PART NUMBER:
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: _ MATERIAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LEAK CAUSES GAS LOSS, LOSS OF SIDE IF LEAK LARGE ENOUGH. POSSIBLE
STRANDING OF CREWPERSON IF BOTH SIDES ARE LOST.
REFERENCES:
w
w
L
REPORT DATE 11/22/86 C-18
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
9/19/86
MMU
123
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PRESSURE GAGE
FAIL HIGH ( INDICATION)
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MMU
2) PROPULSION SUBSYSTEM
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
s)
9)
....CR_TICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: 3/3
POST-OPS: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
SIDE A OR B
CAUSES: MATERIAL FAILURE OF
CONTAMINATION
BOURDON TUBE - TUBE RELAXES, _
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF DETECTED, DIAGNOSE WITH MALF PROCEDURE.
IMPACT.
CONTINUE MISSION, NO
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/19/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 124 FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
ITEM: PRESSURE GAGE
FAILURE MODE: FAIL LOW ( INDICATION)
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MMU
2) PROPULSION SUBSYSTEM
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: 3/3
POST-OPS: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
SIDE A OR B
CAUSES" CONTAMINATION/BLOCKAGE OF BOURDON TUBE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF DETECTED, DIAGNOSE WiTH_L? PROCEDURE. CONTINUE MISSION, NO
IMPACT.
REFERENCES :
L
_I
=
m
REPORT DATE i1/22/86 C-20
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
9/19/86
MMU
125
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RECHARGE QUICK DISCONNECT
FAIL OPEN/LEAK
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MMU
2) PROPULSION SUBSYSTEM
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: 3/3
POST-OPS: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: SIDE A OR B
PART NUMBER:
B [ F ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MATERIAL DEFECT OF SEAL, SPRING FRACTURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAIL OPEN WILL PREVENT RECHARGE AND SUBSEQUENT MISSIONS.
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REFERENCES:
i
m
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REPORT DATE i1/22/86 C-21
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DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
9/19/86
MMU
126
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RECHARGE QUICK DISCONNECT
FAIL CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MMU
2) PROPULSION SUBSYSTEM
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: 3/3
POST-OPS: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
SIDE A OR B
CAUSES: MATERIAL DEFECT, SPRING FRACTURE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE CLOSED OF BOTH QD'S PREVENTS RECHARGE AND SUBSEQUENT
MISSIONS. .....
REFERENCES:
_.=_
mz_
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REPORT DATE 11/22/86 C-22
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/19/86
MMU
127
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GN2 TEST PORT
LEAK
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) MMU
2) PROPULSION SUBSYSTEM
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: 2/IR
POST-OPS: 3/3
REDUNDANCY S_EENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
SIDE A OR B
CAUSES: SEAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSSOF GAS RESULTING IN LOSS OF SIDE. POSSIBLE ST_ING OF
CREWPERSON WITH LOSS OF BOTH sIDES.
REFERENCES:
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DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
9/19/86
MMU
128
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BATTERY
NO OUTPUT - LOW OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLi
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MMU
2) ELECTRICAL SUBSYSTEM
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: 2/IR
POST-OPS: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
SIDE A OR B
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION/ CORROSION, 0PEN
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
L0_+O_BATT_RY-T_DIYCES+LO_S OFPROPULSION SUBSYSTEM. POSSIBLE
ST_iNG,OI_REWPER_SON. .....................................
REFERENCES:
L
W
__+
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REPORT DATE 11/22/86 C-24
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/19/86
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 129
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INTERNAL/EXTERNAL POWER SWITCH
FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MMU
2) ELECTRICAL SUBSYSTEM
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: 2/IR
POST-OPS: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
SIDE A OR B
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MATERIAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER TO HEATERS RESULTS, POSSIBLE L0sS_OF SIDE IF LOW
TEMP. LIMITS EXCEEDED AND EQUIPMENT DAMAGED. POSSIBLE STRANDING
OF CREWPERSON WITH LOSS OF BOTH SIDES.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/19/86
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 130
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INTERNAL/EXTERNAL POWER SWITCH
FAIL TO INTERNAL POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MMU
2) ELECTRICAL SUBSYSTEM
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
...... _ICRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 2/2
OPS: 3/3
POST-OPS: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
SIDE A OR B
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MATERIAL FAILURE OF CONTACT-FRACTURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POWER NOT AVAILABLE TO _TERS DURING STORAGE, POSSIBLE LOSS OF
SIDE DUE TO EQUIPMENT UNDER TEMPS. MISSION TERMINATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE i1/22/86 C-26
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
9/19/86
MMU
131
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INTERNAL/EXTERNAL POWER SWITCH
FAIL TO EXTERNAL POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) M_U
2) ELECTRICAL SUBSYSTEM
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 2/2
OPS: 2/IR
POST-OPS: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
SIDE A OR B
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MATERIAL FAILURE OF CONTACTS-FRACTURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POWER LOSS TO HEATERS DURING FLIGHT. POSSIBLE LOSS OF SIDE.
POSSIBLE STRANDING OF CREWPERSONWITH LOSS OF BOTH SIDES.
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REFERENCES: I
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/19/86
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 132
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TERMINAL BOARD
SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MMU
2) ELECTRICAL SUBSYSTEM
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: 2/IR
POST-OPS: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
SIDE A OR B
CAUSES: DEBRIS, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER TO AFFECTED CIRCUITS AND/OR RAPID BATTERY POWER
USAGE CAUSES LOSS OF SIDE AND MISSION TERMINATION. POSSIBLE TO
STRAND CREWPERSON WITH LOSS OF OTHER ELECTRICAL SUBSYSTEM.
REFERENCES:
EL_
REPORT DATE 11/22/86 C-28
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/19/86
MMU
133
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TERMINAL BOARD
FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MMU
2) ELECTRICAL SUBSYSTEM
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 2/2
0PS: 2/IR
POST-OPS: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: SIDE A OR B
PART NUMBER:
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: IMPACT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ...................
LOSS OF POWER TO AFFECTED CIRCUITS. LOSS OF SIDE. POSSIBLE LOSS
OF CREWPERSON WITH LOSS OF BOTH SIDES.
REFERENCES:
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DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
9/19/86
MMU
134
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MAIN POWER SWITCH
FAIL OFF
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) MMU
2) ELECTRICAL SUBSYSTEM
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 2/2
OPS: 2/IR
POST-OPS: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: A OR B SIDE
PART NUMBER:
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, CORROSION, UNDER TEMPERATURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER TO SIDE. POSSIBLE STRANDING OF CREWPERSON WITH LOSS
OF BOTH SIDES.
REFERENCES:
w
b
REPORT DATE 11/22/86 C-30
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
9/19/86
MMU
135
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MAIN POWERSWITCH
FAIL ON
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYSLEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWNHIERARCHY:
I) MMU
2) ELECTRICAL SUBSYSTEM
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 2/2
OPS: 3/3
POST-OPS: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
SIDE A OR B
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, UNDER TEMPERATURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ..........
CANNOT EMPLOY EXTERNAL PWR DURING STOWAGE, HENCE NO HEATERS
POSSIBLE DAMAGE TO UNIT. MISSION TERMINATION.
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REFERENCES:
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DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
9/19/86
MMU
136
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LTS/HTR.cb
FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MMU
2) ELECTRICAL SUBSYSTEM
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: 2/IR
POST-OPS: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
SIDE A OR B
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER TO ALL HEATERS, POSSIBLE LOSS OF SIDE. POSSIBLE
STRANDING OF CREWPERSON WITH LOSS OF BOTH SIDES.
REFERENCES:
w
u
L
REPORT DATE 11/22/86 C-32
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/19/86
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 137
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
ITEM: LTS/HTR.Cb
FAILURE MODE: FAIL CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) MMU
2) ELECTRICAL SUBSYSTEM
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: 3/2R
POST-OPS: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
SIDE A OR B
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, CORROSION, MECHANICAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF cb PROTECTION IN CASE OF OVERCURRENT TO HEATERS OF
LOCATOR LIGHTS. 2ND FAILURE (i.e. SHORT) REQUIRED FOR MISSION
TERMINATION.
REFERENCES:
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SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
9/19/86
MMU
138
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CEA CIRCUIT BREAKER
FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) m4U
2) ELECTRICAL SUBSYSTEM
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: 2/IR
POST-OPS: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
SIDE A OR B
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER TO ASSOCIATED SUBSYSTEM CEA. THIS RESULTS IN LOSS
OF ASSOCIATED PROPULSION SUBSYSTEM, FORCES IMMEDIATE TERMINATION
OF MISSION. IF BOTH CEA cb's FAIL OPEN, CREWMEMBER IS STRANDED
DUE TO LOSS OF ALL CONTROL AUTHORTY.
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE i1/22/86 C-34
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/19/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 139 FLIGHT: 3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CEA CIRCUIT BREAKER
FAIL CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
m
i
g
m
m
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MMU m
2) ELECTRICAL SUBSYSTEM
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8) m
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: 3/2R
POST-OPS: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: SIDE A OR B
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, CORROSION, MECHANICAL FAILURE
2ND FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO cb PROTECTION IN CASE OF OVERCURRENT TO CEA.
(i.e. SHORT) REQUIRED FOR MISSION TERMINATION.
REFERENCES:
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DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
9/19/86
MMU
140
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GYRO PWR cb
FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MMU
2) ELECTRICAL SUBSYSTEM
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: 3/3
POST-OPS: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] c[p]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
SIDE A OR B
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
MAY CAUSE LOSS OF AUTOMATIC ATTITUDE HOLD. MISSION CONTINUES.
m
REFERENCES:
m
n
REPORT DATE 11/22/86 C-36
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/19/86
MMU
141
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GYRO PWR cb
FAIL CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MMU
2) ELECTRICAL SUBSYSTEM
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: 3/2R
POST-0PS: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: SIDE A OR B
PART NUMBER:
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, CORROSION, MECHANICAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
• NO OVERCURRENTPROTECTION. IPA SECOND FAILURE (i.e. SHORT)
OCCURS DAMAGE TO GYROS MAY CAUSE DAMAGE TO OTHER CEA COMPONENTS.
MISSION TERMINATES IF DETECTED.
REFERENCES:
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mm
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DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
9/19/86
MMU
142
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
VDA cb
FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MMU
2) ELECTRICAL SUBSYSTEM
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: 2/IR
POST-OPS: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
SIDE A OR B
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER TO VDA'S. RESULTS IN LOSS OF SIDE. POSSIBLE LOSS OF
CREWPERSON WITH LOSS OF BOTH SIDES.
m
REFERENCES:
z
REPORT DATE 11/22/86 C-38
INDEPENDENT 0RBITER ASSES_T
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/19/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 143 FLIGHT: 3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
VDA cb
FAIL CLOSE
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
m
I
m
m
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MMU ms
2) ELECTRICAL SUBSYSTEM
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8) m
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC n
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: 3/2R
POST-OPS: 3/3 []
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: SIDE A OR B
PART NUMBER:
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL FAILURE, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO OVERCURRENT PROTECTION TO VDA'S. IF AI SHORT OCCURS, POSSIBLE
DAMAGE TO OTHER COMPONENTS AND MISSION TERMINATION.
REFERENCES:
z
B
I
D
B
m
J
m
g
REPORT DATE 11/22/86 C-39
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/19/86
MMU
144
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LOCATOR LIGHT SWITCH
FAIL OFF
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) MMU
2) ELECTRICAL SUBSYSTEM
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: 3/3
POST-OPS: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[F]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL FAILURE, ELECTRICAL OPEN
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF LOCATOR LIGHTS. MISSION CONTI_ES.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/22/86 C-40
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/19/86
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 145
ITEM: LOCATOR LIGHT SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: FAIL ON POSITION A
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
1) m_U
2) ELECTRICAL SUBSYSTEM
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: 3/3
POST-OPS: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL FAILURE, SHORT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LIGHT POWER SOURCE NOT SELECTABLE. MISSION CONTINUES.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
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REFERENCES:
R
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g
REPORT DATE 11/22/86 C-41
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/19/86
MMU
146
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LOCATOR LIGHT SWITCH
FAIL ON POSITION B
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MMU
2) ELECTRICAL SUBSYSTEM
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: 3/3
POST-OPS: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL FAILURE, SHORT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LIGHT POWER SOURCE NOT SELECTABLE. MISSION CONTINUES.
REFERENCES:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
REPORT DATE i1/22/86 C-42
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/19/86
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 147
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LOCATOR LIGHT POWER CONVERTER
FAIL HIGH/FAIL LOW
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MMU
2) ELECTRICAL SUBSYSTEM
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: 3/2R
POST-OPS: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, SHORT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ..........
LOSS OF LOCATQR_LIGHTS MAY RESULT. MISSION MAY BE IMPACTED DUE
TO POWER UASGE ON THE BATTERY SIDE WITH SHORT AND IF OTHER SIDE'S
POWER FAILS.
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 11/22/86 C-43
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/19/86
MMU
148
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LIGHT
1-3 LIGHTS BURN OUT
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) _u
2) ELECTRICAL SUBSYSTEM
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: 3/3
POST-OPS: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: MATERIAL DEFECT. LIFETIME LIMIT.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
EACH LAMP HAS 4 INDEPENDENT FILAMENTS ON 2 SEPARATE BUSES.
OPERATE INDEPENDENTLY.
REFERENCES:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
LAMPS
REPORT DATE 11/22/86 C-44
INDEPENDE_ ORBITER ASSESSME_
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/19/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 149 FLIGHT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GYRO POWER SWITCH
FAIL OPEN (OFF)
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
mm
I
m
B
m
i
m
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MMU u
2) ELECTRICAL SUBSYSTEM
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: 3/3
POST-OPS: 3/3 m
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MISSION CONTINUES.
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, UNDERTEMP.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF AUTOMATIC ATTITUDE HOLD.
m
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REFERENCES:
i
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/19/86
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 150
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GYRO POWER SWITCH
FAIL ON IN A OR B
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MMU
2) ELECTRICAL SUBSYSTEM
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: 3/3
POST-OPS: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, UNDERTEMP.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ....................................
INABILITY TO SELECT ALTERNATE POWER SOURCE OR:DESELECTCURRENT
POWER SOURCE. MISSION CONTINUES.
REFERENCES:
mmm
b_
REPORT DATE 11/22/86 C-46
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/19/86
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 151
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GYRO POWER SUPPLY
FAIL OFF/FAIL HIGH/FAIL LOW
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY .....SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MMU
ELECTRICAL SUBSYSTEM
GYRO POWER SUPPLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: 3/3
POST-OPS: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: OVERTEMP, CONTAMINATION, MEDICAL FAILURE, SHORT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CAUSES DEGRADATION OR LOSS OF AUTOMATIC ATTITUDE HOLD.
CONTINUES.
MISSION
m
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REFERENCES: m
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/19/86
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 152
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CEA POWER SWITCH
FAIL ON IN ISO.
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MMU
2) ELECTRICAL SUBSYSTEM
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: 2/IR
POST-OPS: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
SIDE A OR B
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANi_ FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ISOLATES SIDE' CAUSES LOSS OF SIDE.
CREWPERSON IF OTHER SIDE FAILS ALSO.
POSSIBLE LOSS (STRANDING) OF
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/22/86 C-48
INDEPE_ENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/19/86
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 153
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
ITEM: CEA POWER SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: FAIL ON
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MMU
2) ELECTRICAL SUBSYSTEM
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: 3/3
POST-OPS: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: SIDE A OR B
PART NUMBER:
B [ P ] C [ F ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, UNDER TEMP.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO SELECTIVELY ISOLATE WITHOUT USE OF MAIN PWR SW.
IMPACTS.
NO
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 11/22/86 C-49
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/19/86
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 154
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CEA POWER SWITCH
FAIL OFF
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) m4U
2) ELECTRICAL SUBSYSTEM
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
_ CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: 2/IR
POST-OPS: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
SIDE A OR B
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, UNDER TEMP.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNDER TEMP FAILURES WOULD OCCUR BEFORE FLIGHT. MISSION
TERMINATION. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREWPERSON WITH LOSS OF OTHER CEA
DURING FLIGHT.
REFERENCES:
L
w
REPORT DATE 11/22/86 C-50
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/19/86
MMU
155
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT :
HDW/FUNC
3/3
ITEM :
FAILURE MODE :
CEA POWER SWITCH
FAIL OFF IN ISO.
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MMU
2) ELECTRICAL SUBSYSTEM
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: 3/3
POST-OPS: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: SIDE A OR B
PART NUMBER:
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL FAILURE, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
NO EFFECT.
REFERENCES:
D
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/19/86
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 156
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PRESSURE GAGE LIGHT
FAIL OFF
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) m4U
2) ELECTRICAL SUBSYSTEM
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
° FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: 3/3
• POST-OPS: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
A [ 2 ] B [ P ] c[P]
CAUSES: OPEN, THERMAL CYCLING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
GAUGE MAY FREEZE BUT OTHER GAUGE MAY BE USED. LOSS OF BOTH
RESULTS IN NO IMPACTS.
REFERENCES:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
REPORT DATE 11/22/86 C-52
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/19/86
MMU
157
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
THRUSTER CUE LT.
FAIL OFF
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) MMU
2) ELECTRICAL SUBSYSTEM
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: 3/3
POST-OPS: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES:
SIDE A OR B
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NON-_ITiCAL FuN_ION. NO IMPACTS,
HDW/FUNC
3/3
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REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 11/22/86 C-53
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/19/86
MMU
158
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROL ELECTRONICS ASSEMBLY
FAIL ON 1-12 CH.
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) MMU
2) ELECTRICAL SUBSYSTEM
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: 2/1R
POST-OPS: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: MATERIAL DEFECT, CONTAMINATION, SHORT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF SIDE, UNCOMMANDED ACCELERATION. POSSIBLE STRANDING OF
CREWPERSON WITH LOSS OF BOTH SIDES.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/22/86 C-54
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/19/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 159 FLIGHT: 2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
coNTroLEL eTRONICS
FAIL OFF 1-12 CH.
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
I
U
I
m
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
1 ) MMU
2 ) ELECTRICAL SUBSYSTEM "
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: 2/IR
POST-OPS: 3/3
B [ P ] C [ P ]REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: MATERIAL DEFECT, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF SIDE, UNCOMMANDED ACCELERATION. SINGLE CHANNEL FAILURE
MAY BE DIFFICULT TO DETECT. POSSIBLE ST_ING OF CREWPERSON WITH
LOSS OF BOTH SIDES.
REFERENCES:
m
m
mm
mm
i
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/19/86
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 160
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROL ELECTRONICS ASSEMBLY
NOISY OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MMU
2) ELECTRICAL SUBSYSTEM
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: 2/1R
POST-OPS: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: MATERIAL DEFECT, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ERATIC RESPONSE TO COMMANDS.. .......VEHICLE MAY BECOME UNCONTROLLABLE
UNTIL SIDE TURNED OFF. POSSIBLE STRANDING OF CREWPERSON WITH LOSS
OF BOTH SIDES.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/22/86 C-56
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/19/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 161 FLIGHT: 2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROL ELECTRONICS ASSEMBLY
LOGIC FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
l
I
u
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MMU
2) ELECTRICAL SUBSYSTEM
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: 2/IR
POST-0PS: 3/3
B [ P ] C [ P ]REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: MATERIAL DEFECT, CONTAMINATION _
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ERATIC RESPONSE TO COMMANDS. VEHICLE MAY BECOME UNCONTROLLABLE
UNTIL SIDE TURNED OFF. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREWPERSON WITH LOSS OF
BOTH SIDES.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/19/86
MMU
162
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ISOLATION VALVE TIMER
FAIL OFF
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MMU
2) ELECTRICAL SUBSYSTEM
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
:_ CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 2/2
OPS: 3/3
POST-OPS: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
SIDE A OR B
CAUSES: ELECTRONICS FAILURE, DUE TO THERMAL CYCLING, OPEN, SHORT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
MISSION TREMINATION WITH LOSS OF ACCESS TO MAIN-FOLD DURING PRE-
OPS.
REFERENCES:
R
h---
REPORT DATE 11/22/86 C-58
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
9/19/86
MMU
163
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ISOLATION VALVE TIMER
TOO SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MMU
2) ELECTRICAL SUBSYSTEM
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: 2/2
POST-OPS: 3/3
REDUNDAN_CY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: SIDE A OR B
PART NUMBER:
B [ F ] C [ P ]
CAUSES:
SHORT
MATERIAL FAILURE, SOLID-STATE TIMER DRIFTS, ELECTRICAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE_ _
VALVE WILL EITHER NOT FULLY CLOSE OR NOT FULLY OPEN DEPENDING ON
TIME OF FAILURE. MISSION TERMINATION WITH LOSS OF EFFICIENCY IN
SIDE WHERE VALVE FAILED.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/19/86
MMU
164
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ISOLATION VALVE TIMER
FAILS ON
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) _U
2) ELECTRICAL SUBSYSTEM
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: 2/IR
POST-OPS: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
SIDE A OR B
CAUSES: MATERIAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DRIVES MOTOR AFTER VALVE FULLY OPEN OR CLOSED. CAN BURN OUT
MOTOR. USES EXCESSIVE BATTERY POWER. MISSION TERMINATION.
POSSIBLE STRANDING OF CREWPERSON WITH LOSS OF OTHER SIDE.
REFERENCES:
w
n
C-60REPORT DATE 11/22/86
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
9/19/86
MMU
166
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
VALVE DRIVER AMPLIFIER
FAIL OFF
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MMU
2) ELECTRICAL SUBSYSTEM
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: 2/IR
POST-OPS: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: SIDE A OR B
PART NUMBER:
B[F] C[P]
CAUSES: MATERIAL FAILURE, ELECTRICAL OPEN
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THRUSTER FAILS oFF , I_O vnv. FAILS OPEN OR CLOSED. MISSION
TERMINATION. CREWMEMBER Cou£b __ED WiTH_i_SS_OF _OTHER
SIDE.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/19/86
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 167
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM: VALVE DRIVER _LIFIER
FAILURE MODE: FAIL ON
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) _MU
2) ELECTRICAL SUBSYSTEM
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: 2/IR
POST-OPS: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
SIDE A OR B
CAUSES: MATERIAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THRUSTER FAIL ON OR ISO VLV. MOTOR CONTINUOUSLY DRIVEN. MISSION
TERMINATION. POSSIBLE STRANDING OF CREWPERSON WITH LOSS OF OTHER
SIDE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/22/86 C-62
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/19/86
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 168
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
VALVE DRIVER AMPLIFIER
NOISY
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MMU
2) ELECTRICAL SUBSYSTEM
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: 2/IR
POST-OPS: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
SIDE A OR B
CAUSES: MATERIAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INTERMITTANT UNCOMMANDED ACCELERATIONS, ERRATIC CONTROL RESPONSE.
MISSION T_INATiON_ POSSIB£E STRANDING OF C_PERSON IF BOTH
SIDES FAIL.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9119/86
MMU
169
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TRANSLATIONAL HAND CONTROLLER
FAIL ON i-3 AXES
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) MMU
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
s)
9)
ELECTRICAL SUBSYSTEM
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-O PS : 2/2
OPS: 1/1
POST-OPS: 3/3
A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
CAUSES: LOOSE MAGNET, MECHANICAL JAMMING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE CANNOT BE ISOLATED.
REQUI_D. RESCUE REQUIRED.
LOSS OF PROPULSION CONTROL.
HDW/FUNC
i/i
ABORT
w
i
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/22/86 C-64
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/19/86
MMU
170
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TRANSLATIONAL HAND CONTROLLER
FAIL OFF 1-3 AXES
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MMU
2) ELECTRICAL SUBSYSTEM
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS : 2/2
OPS: I/1
POST-OPS: 3/3
RED_D_CY SCREENS:
_CATION:
P_T _MBER:
A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: _OSE MAGNET, MEC_I_L J_MING
EFFECTS/_TIONALE :
IF FAIL OFF IN ALL 3 _ES, _SS OF PROPU_ION _CTION.
REQUIRED. _WPE_ON IS ST_DED.
HDW/_NC
i/i
RESCUE
mm
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REFE_NCES :
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/19/86
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 171
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
ITEM: ROTATIONAL HAND CONTROLLER
FAILURE MODE: FAIL ON (1-3 AXES)
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) MMU
2) ELECTRICAL SUBSYSTEM
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 2/2
OPS: 1/1
POST-OPS: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: LOOSE MAGNET, MECHANICAL JAMMING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE CANNOT BE ISOLATED.
CREWPERSON STRANDED.
ABORT REQUIRED. RESCUE REQUIRED.
REFERENCES:
L
REPORT DATE 11/22/86 C-66
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/19/86
MMU
172
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
1/l
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ROTATIONAL HAND CONTROLLER
FAIL OFF (1-3 AXES)
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) MMU
2) ELECTRICAL SUBSYSTEM
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 2/2
OPS: i/i
POST-OPS: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: LOOSE MAGNET, MECHANICAL JAMMING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CREWMEMBER MAYNOT BE ABLE TO RETURN TO ORBITER WITH THC ONLY.
CREWPERSON CAN BE STRANDED.
I
&,,
[]
mR
g
l
m
REFERENCES:
g
ms
REPORT DATE 11/22/86 C-67
I
= .
lee
i
eme
emm
=
_mm
u
W
w
i
INDEPENDENT ORBITER A$SESS M_ENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9119/86
MMU
173
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
i/I
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
THC ISOLATE SWITCH
FAIL ON
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MMU
2) ELECTRICAL SUBSYSTEM
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
_ CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 2/2
OPS: 1/1
POST-OPS: 3/3
A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL JAM, SWITCH MAT_L FAIL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL PROPULSIVE CAPABILITY.
STRANDED
RESCUE REQUIRED. CREWPERSON
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/22/86 C-68
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/19/86
MMU
174
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
THC ISOLATE SWITCH
FAIL OFF
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MMU
2) ELECTRICAL SUBSYSTEM
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CR!T_ICALIT_IES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: 2/2
POST-OPS: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: MECHANICAL JAM, SWITCH MAT'L FAILS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO ABORT VIA THC. MISSION TERMINATION.
REFERENCES:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/19/86
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 175
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
ITEM: AUTOMATIC ATTITUDE HOLD SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: FAIL ON
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MMU
2) ELECTRICAL SUBSYSTEM
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
_i_. :_._CRITICALITIES
..............FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: 2/2
POST-OPS: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ F ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: MECHANICAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
EXCESSIVE USE OF PROPELLANT FOR ROTATIONAL MANEUVERS. MISSION
IMPACT/TERMINATION RESULTS
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/22/86 C-70
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/19/86
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 176
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
AUTOMATIC ATTITUDE HOLD SWITCH
FAIL OFF
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
HDW/FUNC
3/3
n
D
m
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MMU
2) ELECTRICAL SUBSYSTEM n
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: 3/3
POST-OPS: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: MECHANICAL FAILURE _
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO CRITICAL IMPACTS.
c[p]
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REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/19/86
MMU
177
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ALTERNATE CONTROL MODES SWITCH
FAIL OFF
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) MMU
2) ELECTRICAL SUBSYSTEM
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
_ CR!TICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: 2/2
POST-OPS: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ F ]
CAUSES: MATERIAL FAILURE OF CONTACTS-FRACTURE, UNDER TEMP
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DEGRADATION IN ABILITY TO STABILIZE SATELLITE OR MATCH RATES WITH
SPINNING SATELLITE. INABILITY TO SELECTIVELY DISABLE AAH WITHOUT
ACTUAL ROTATIONAL INPUT. INABILITY TO SELECT SATELLITE
STABILIZATION THRUSTER SELECT LOGIC. POSSIBLE MISSION IMPACT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/22/86 C-72
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/19/86
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 178
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
ITEM: ALTERNATE CONTROL MODES SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: FAIL ON SATELLITE STABILIZER
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) MMU
2) ELECTRICAL SUBSYSTEM
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
_ITI_ITIES ....
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: 3/3
POST-OPS: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION.
PART NUMBER:
A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ F ]
CAUSES: MATERIAL FAILURE DUE TO THERMAL CYCLING, CONTAMINATION
BINDS SWITCH
EFFECTS/RATIONALE_I__ _ _i__----_ ........ii__ _ _ _.....i_i_
DEGRADATION IN ABILITY TO PERFORM ROTATIONAL _UVERS--SATELLITE
STABILIZATION THRUSTER SELECT LOGIC IS USED FOR ALL COMMANDS.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/19/86
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 179
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ALTERNATE CONTROL MODES SWITCH
FAIL ON IN "AXIS INHIBIT"
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MMU
2) ELECTRICAL SUBSYSTEM
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: 3/3
POST-OPS: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ F ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: MATERIAL FAILURE DUE TO THERMAL CYCLING, CONTAMINATION
BINDS SWITCH
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ONE (OR MORE) ROTATIONAL AXES INHIBIT FROM AUTOMATIC ATTITUDE
HOLD. NO IMPACTS.
REFERENCES:
i
REPORT DATE i1/22/86 C-74
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/19/86
MMU
180
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT :
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GYRO PHASE PLANE LOGIC
FAIL OFF 1-3 CH.
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MMU
2) ELECTRICAL SUBSYSTEM
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: 3/3
POST-OPS: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: MATERIAL DEFECT, OVERTEMP_ CONTACTS FRACTURE, OPEN
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF AAH IN AFFECTED AXIS.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
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REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/19/86
MMU
181
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT :
HDW/FUNC
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GYRO PHASE PLANE LOGIC
NOISY/FALSE OUTPUTS
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) m_U
2) ELECTRICAL SUBSYSTEM
3) CEA
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: 3/3
POST-OPS: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: MATERIAL DEFECT DUE TO CONTACTS FRACTURED, OVERTEMP
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
MAY FORCE SHUTDOWN OF AAH. NO IMPACTS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/22/86 C-76
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/19/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 182 FLIGHT: 2/IR
ITEM: CEA PWR SPLY .......
FAILURE MODE: FAIL HIGH OR LOW, GREATER THAN 5.1V, LESS THAN
4.9V
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
m
J
I
m
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MMU B
2) ELECTRICAL SUBSYSTEM
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: 2/IR
POST-OPS: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: SIDE A OR B
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: OVERTEMP, SHORT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE ." ......
DIGITAL LOGIC IN CEA FAILS DUE TO INCORRECT VOLTAGE INPUT. LOSS
OF CONTROL AUTHORITY TO THAT PROPULSION SIDE RESULTS. LOSS OF CEA
LOGIC SELECT RESULTS IN MISSION TERMINATION. POSSIBLE LOSS OF
CRY,PERSONIFOTH - POWERSUPPLYFAILS.
REFERENCES:
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DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
9/19/86
MMU
183
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
WIRE HARNESS
SHORT OR OPEN CIRCUIT
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) MMU
2) ELECTRICAL SUBSYSTEM
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
_...._ FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
_ OPS: 2/IR
POST-OPS: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
SIDE A OR B
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF AFFECTED SIDE DUE TO LACK OF, OR ERRATIC, CONTROL
AUTHORITY. POSSIBLE STRANDING OF CREWPERSON WITH LOSS OF BOTH
SIDES.
m
REFERENCES:
n
u
E
REPORT DATE 11/22/86 C-78
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/19/86
MMU
184
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EXTERNAL POWER CONNECTOR
FAIL OPEN, 1 OR MORE PINS
HDW/FUNC
2/2
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MMU
2) ELECTRICAL SUBSYSTEM
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 2/2
OPS: 3/3
POST-OPS: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C[F]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
SIDE A OR B
CAUSES: BENT PIN, CONT INATiON
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF HEATER POWER DURING STOWAGE RESULTING IN LOSS OF HEATED
COMPONENT AND LOSS OF MISSION.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/19/86
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 185
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HEATERS
FAIL OFF
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) MMU
2) ELECTRICAL SUBSYSTEM
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 2/2
OPS: 2/2
POST-OPS: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ F ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
SIDE A OR B
CAUSES: ELECTRICAL 0PEN/SHORT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POSSIBLE LOSS OF HEATED COMPONENT DURING STORAGE OR FLIGHT.
MISSION TERMINATION REQUIRED.
REFERENCES:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
M
w
REPORT DATE 11/22/86 C-80
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
9/19/86
MMU
186
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HEATERS
FAIL ON (CEA)
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) MMU
2) ELECTRICAL SUBSYSTEM
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: 2/IR
POST-OPS: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: SIDE A OR B
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: MATERITAL DEFECT IN THERMOSTAT
c[P]
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CEA SIDE DUE TO OVERTEMP. POSSIBLE STRANDING OF
CREWPERSON IF BOTH CEA SIDES LOST.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/19/86
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 187
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM: GYROS
FAILURE MODE: DRIFT
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MMU
2) ELECTRICAL SUBSYSTEM
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: 3/3
POST-OPS: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ F ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: OUT OF SPEC. TEMPERATURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CONTINUOUS ROTATIONAL INPUT, NO ATT. HOLD IN THAT AXIS.
MUST BE DISABLED).
REFERENCES:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
(AAH
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REPORT DATE i1/22/86 C-82
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/19/86
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 188
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM: GYROS
FAILURE MODE: FAIL OFF
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) _U
2) ELECTRICAL SUBSYSTEM
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: 3/3
POST-OPS: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ F ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: OUT OF SPEC. TEMPERATURE, ELECTRICAL OPEN
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO AAH IN AFFECTED AXIS. MISSION MAY CONTINUE.
_W/FUNC
3/3
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REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/19/86
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 189
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ITEM: ARM ANGLE ADJUST
FAILURE MODE: ARM DOES NOT LATCH TO FLIGHT POSITION (UNLATCHED,
LATCHED STOWED, LATCHED WORKSITE, LATCHED FLIGHT).
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MMU
STRUCTURES & MECHANISMS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: 3/3
POST-OPS: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: LEFT OR RIGHT ARM
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: MECHANISM BINDS, CONTAMINATION
c E P ]
EFFE_-TS/RATIONALE:
LAT_ IS DISENGAGED ENTIRELY AND_PiNNED IN FLIGHT POSITION. NO
IMPACTS.
REFERENCES:
i i l
REPORT DATE 11/22/86 C-84
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
9/19/86
MMU
190
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT :
HDW/FUNC
2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ARM LENGTH ADJUST
FAIL UNLATCHED
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MMU
2) STRUCTURES & MECHANISMS
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS : 2/ 2
OPS: 2/2
POST-OPS : 3/ 3
A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LEFT OR RIGHT SIDE
CAUSES: MECHANISM BINDS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POOR__FIT CAN RESULT INDIFFICULTY/INABILITY TO COMPLETELY
CONTROL TRANSLATIONS OR ROTATIONS. MISSION IM_ACLT/TERMiNATION.
n
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/19/86
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 191
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ARM LENGTH ADJUST
FAIL LATCHED SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) _u
2) STRUCTURES & MECHANISMS
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 2/2
OPS: 2/2
POST-OPS: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: LEFT OR RIGHT SIDE
PART NUMBER:
B[P] C[P]
CAUSES: ADJUSTS MECHANISM BINDS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POOR CREWMAN FIT CAN RESULT IN DIFFICULTY/INABILITY TO COMPLETELY
CONTROL TRANSLATIONS _ROTAT_0_ ...._I_SSION iMPACTFTERMINATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/22/86 C-86
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/19/86
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 192
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ARM LENGTH ADJUST
FAIL LATCHED LONG
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MMU
2) STRUCTURES & MECHANISMS
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 2/2
OPS: 2/2
POST-OPS: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
LEFT OR RIGHT SIDE
CAUSES: ADJUSTS MECHANISM BINDS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POOR CR_FITI_RESULTIIN DIFFICULTy/INABILITYIT0 COMPLETELY
CO_ROL TR_SLATIONS OR ROTATIONS. MISSION IMPACT/TERMINATION.
REFERENCES:
B
ms
m
U
mm
i
m
m
ms
mm
mm
l
REPORT DATE 11/22/86 C-87
l
Z--
I
B
m
mm
==
,p--
m
_mm
U
u
m_m
w
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/19/86
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 194
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EXTERNAL POWER CONNECTOR
FAIL CONNECTED
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MMU
STRUCTURES & MECHANISMS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 2/2
OPS: 2/2
POST-OPS: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONNECTOR BINDS DUE TO THERMAL CYCLING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
MISSION LOST, INABILITY TO LEAVE FSS.
REFERENCES:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
w
REPORT DATE 11/22/86 C-88
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/19/86
MMU
195
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EXTERNAL POWER CONNECTOR
FAIL DISCONNECTED
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MMU
STRUCTURES & MECHANISMS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 2/2
OPS: 3/3
POST-OPS: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ F ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: MECHANISM BINDS DUE TO THERMAL CYCLING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
COMPONENTS AND SUBSEQUENT USE OF MMU MAY BE LOST DUE TO LACK OF
POWER TO HEATERS WHEN IN FSS.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/19/86
MMU
196
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PLSS LATCHES
FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MMU
2) STRUCTURES & MECHANISMS
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
c CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/2R
OPS: 2/IR
POST-OPS: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
LEFT OR RIGHT SIDE
CAUSES: MECHANICAL BINDING OR DAMAGE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LAP BELTS PROVIDE BACKUP. LOSS OF LATCHING CAPABILITY MAY RESULT
IN LOSS OF CREW VIA SEPARATION FROM MMU IF LAP BELT FAILS.
= :
w
J
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/22/86 C-90
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
9/19/86
MMU
197
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PLSS LATCHES
FAIL CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MMU
STRUCTURES & MECHANISMS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: 3/3
POST-OPS: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
LEFT OR RIGHT SIDE
CAUSES: MECHANICAL BINDING OR DAMAGE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ONLY ONE LATCH NEEDS TO OPERATE FOR PLSS RELEASE. IF ALL LATCHES
FAIL CLOSED, CREWMEMBER ENTERS AIRLOCK WITH MMU ATTACHED AND
SUBSEQUENT MISSIONS ARE IMPACTED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/22/86 C-91
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DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
9/19/86
MMU
198
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MMU BATTERY LATCHES
FAIL UNLATCHED
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MMU
2) STRUCTURES & MECHANISMS
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i:
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 2/2
OPS: /NA
POST-OPS: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: MECHANICAL FAILURE - BINDS, SPRING FRACTURES
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF SIDE RESULTS SINCE SECURE POWER SOURCE IS NOT AVAILABLE.
MISSION TERMINATION.
REFERENCES:
E
REPORT DATE 11/22/86 C-92
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/19/86
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 199
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MMU BATTERY LATCHES
FAIL LATCHED
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MMU
STRUCTURES & MECHANISMS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: 3/3
POST-OPS: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: SIDE A OR B
PART NUMBER:
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL FAILURE - BINDS, SPRING FRACTURES
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BATTERY CANNOT BE RECHARGED, SUBSEQUENT MISSION LOST.
REFERENCES:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/19/86
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 200
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BACKUP ARM LATCH
FAIL LATCHED
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MMU
STRUCTURES & MECHANISMS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: 2/2
POST-OPS: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: RIGHT OR LEFT ARM
PART NUMBER:
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: SNAP FAILS MECHANICALLY - BINDS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNLESS LATCH IS CUT,_ _OT_BERELEASED_WMU-NOT FLYABLE.
LATCH CUT, PRIMARY LATCH MUST BEAR ENTRY & LANDING LOADS ALONE.
IF
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/22/86 C-94
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
9/19/86
MMU
201
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE :
BACKUP ARM LATCH
FAIL UNLATCHED
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MMU
2) STRUCTURES & MECHANISMS
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: 2/2
POST-OPS: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
RIGHT OR LEFT ARM
CAUSES: SNAP FAILS MECHANICALLY, DEBRIS IN SNAP
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ARM DAMAGED IF PRIMARY LATCH FAILS. MISSION IMPACT OR DAMAGE.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/19/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 202 FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
QD THERMAL COVERS
FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
MMU
STRUCTURES & MECHANISMS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: 3/2R
POST-OPS: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: VELCR0 FAILURE DUE TO EMBRITTLEMENT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
QD MAY BECOME INOPERABLE IF EXPOSED TO EXTREMES OF HEAT OR COLD.
USE OTHER QD FOR RECHARGE. NO RECHARGE IF BOTH QD'S ARE FAILED.
MISSION TERMINATION FOR SUBSEQUENT MISSIONS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE i1/22/86 C-96
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/19/86
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 203
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BATTERY THERMAL COVER
FAIL OPEN DURING STOWAGE
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MMU
2) STRUCTURES & MECHANISMS
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: 3/3
POST-OPS: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: SIDE A OR B
PART NUMBER:
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: VELCRO FAILURE DUE TO EMBRITTLEMENT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BATTERIES MAY FAIL DUE TO EXPOSURE TO TEMPERATURE EXTREMES.
CAUSES DIFFICULTY WITH RECHARGE, POSSIBLE DELAY/LOSS IN SECOND
MISSION.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/19/86
MMU
204
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT :
HDW/FUNC
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BATTERY THERMAL COVER
FAIL OPEN DURING FLIGHT
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MMU
STRUCTURES & MECHANISMS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHTPHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: 3/3
POST-OPS: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: SIDE A OR B
PART NUMBER:
B [ F ] C [ F ]
CAUSES: CREWMEMBER IMPACT. VELCRO FAILURE DUE TO EMBRITTLEMENT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMPACT.
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 11/22/86 C-98
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9119/86
MMU
205
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EXT. PWR. THERMAL COVER
FAIL OPEN DURING FLIGHT
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MMU
2) STRUCTURES & MECHANISMS
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: 3/3
POST-OPS: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ F ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CREWMEMBER IMPACT. VELCRO FAILURE DUE TO EMBRITTLEMENT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMPACT.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/19/86
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 206
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BACKUP PLSS LATCHES (LAP BELTS)
FAIL OPEN DURING FLIGHT
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
MMU
STRUCTURES & MECHANISMS
_=_ITICALITIES
FLIGH[fPHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/2R
OPS: 2/IR
POST-OPS: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CREW ERROR, WORN EYELET, BROKEN CONE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANT BACKUP LATCHES PREVENT LOSS OF CREW IN CASE OF PRIMARY
LATCH/FAILURE. FULL COMPLEMENT OF LATCHES REQUIRED TO
BEGIN/CONTINUE FLIGHT. LOSS OF ALL LATCHES CAN RESULT IN LOSS OF
CREWPERSON BY SEPARATION FROM MMU.
REFERENCES:
L
_m
REPORT DATE i1/22/86 C-100
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
I_EPE_E_ ORBITER ASSESSME_
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM _YSIS WORKSHEET
9/19/86
MMU
207
HIG_ST _ITI_ITY
FLIG_:
_W/FUNC
2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BACKUP PLSS LATCHES
FAIL CLOSED
LE_ _YST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS L_D: G. __LLI
BREAKDO_ HIE__:
1) MMU
2) STRUCTURES & MEC_ISMS
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
_ITI_ITIES
FLIG_ P_SE _W/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: 3/3
POST-OPS: 2/2
REDU_CY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LO_TION:
P_T _MBER:
RIG_ OR LEFT SIDE
_USES: BROKEN C0_ DUE TO IMPACT OR _TERI_ DEFECT
EFFECTS/_TION_E:
LOST FOR SUBSEQUE_ MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF FULL REDU_CY IN
_T_S _I_ ENSURE _EMBER REShiP. •
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/26/86
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 208
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
ITEM: GN2 LINES
FAILURE MODE: LEAK
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) MMU
2) FSS
3) PNEUMATIC SUBSYSTEM
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
:_i _ CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: 3/3
POST-OPS: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: SIDE A OR B
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: MATERIAL FAILURE, CREWMEMBER IMPACT, SEAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ONE RECHARGE SYSTEM, POSSIBLE ORBITER GAS LOSS (OTHER FSS
COULD BE USED FOR RECHARGE). MISSION LOST IF OTHER FSS LOST.
REFERENCES:
E
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REPORT DATE 11/22/86 C-i02
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/26/86
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 210
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
ITEM: GN2 LINES
FAILURE MODE: BLOCKED
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MMU
2) FSS
3) PNEUMATIC SUBSYSTEM
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: 3/3
POST-OPS: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: SIDE A OR B ....
PART NUMBER:
CAUSESi CO_AMINATION, PINED BY CREWMEMBER IMPACT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE; ...........
LOSS OF ONE RECHARGE SYSTEM. SUBSEQUENT MISSIONS L0ST iF_OTHER
SUBSYSTEM LOST.
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DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
9/26/86
MMU
211
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PRESSURE GUAGE
LEAK
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MMU
2) FSS
3) PNEUMATIC SUBSYSTEM
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
'CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: 3/3
POST-OPS: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: SIDE A OR B
PART NUMBER:
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: SAEL FAILURE/GALLED
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF GN2, INACCURATE GAS READINGS, LOSS OF SIDE.
LOSS OF SUBSEQUENT MISSIONS WITH LOSS OF BOTH SIDES.
POSSIBLE
REFERENCES:
w
REPORT DATE 11/22/86 C-I04
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/26/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 212 FLIGHT: 3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
VENT VALVE
FAIL CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
m
i
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MMU
2) FSS m
3) PNEUMATIC SUBSYSTEM
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) n
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: 3/3
POST-OPS: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
B [ P ] C [ P ]
SIDE A OR B
CAUSES: DEBRIS/CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL FAILURE, GALLING OF
TOGGLE OR FOLLOWER, UNDER TEMP
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF AFFECTED RECHARGE SYSTEM. LOSS OF SUBSEQUENT MISSIONS
WITH LOSS OF BOTH SIDES.
REFERENCES:
mm
mm
J
i
l
mm
m
,,m
I
REPORT DATE 11/22/86 C-i05
wL_
w
m
i
=
L
_DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
9126/86
MMU
213
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
VENT VALVE
FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MMU
2) FSS
3) PNEUMATIC SUBSYSTEM
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHTPHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: 3/3
POST-0PS: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
SIDE A OR B
CAUSES: DEBRIS, GALLING OF TOGGLE OR FOLLOWER, BELLEVILE SPRING
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROBABLE LOSS OF AFFECTED SIDE EXCESSIVE GAS LOSS. _ GANS MIGHT BE
FIRED PREMATURELY. POSSIBLE LOSS OF SUBSEQUENT MISSIONS WITH LOSS
OF BOTH SIDES.
REFERENCES:
w
REPORT DATE 11/22/86 C-I06
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/26/86
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 214
HIGHEST_CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
_W/FUNC
3/2R
ITEM: VENT VALVE
FAILURE MODE: LEAK
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MMU
2) FSS
3) PNEUMATIC SUBSYSTEM
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: 3/3
POST-QP$: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION"
PART NUMBER:
SIDE A OR B
CAUSES: O-RING FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
Loss OF ONE RECHARGE SYSTEM, POSSIBLE OR_!TER__GAS_DO_S.M_I__ON
LOST IF OTHER:-FSS LOST. _ ........................
mm
I
J
mm
mm
m
i
i
J
mm
i
REFERENCES:
i
I
REPORT DATE 11/22/86 C-I07
m
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w
INDEP_ENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/26/86
MMU
215
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
QD-HOSE END
FAIL OPEN, LEAK
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MMU
2) FSS
3) PNEUMATIC SUBSYSTEM
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: 3/3
POST-OPS: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
SIDE A OR B
CAUSES: THREADS GALLED O-RING DAMAGE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT TO OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
r_
REPORT DATE 11/22/86 C-I08
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/26/86
MMU
216
NIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
QD-HOSE END
FAIL CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) FSS
2) PNEUMATIC SUBSYSTEM
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: 3/3
POST-OPS: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: SIDE A OR B
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: THREAD GALL CONTAMINATION
B[P] C[P]
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF AFFECTED SIDE AND LOSS OF SUBSEQUENT MISSIONS IF BOTH
SIDES LOST.
m
m
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REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 11/22/86 C-I09
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DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
9/26/86
MMU
217
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
QD-FIXED HALF
LEAK, FAILED OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) FSS
2) PNEUMATIC SUBSYSTEM
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: 3/3
POST-OPS: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] c[p]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
SIDE A OR B
CAUSES: POPPET NOT SEALED, O-RING DAMAGE, DEBRIS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF RECHARGE SIDE IF LEAK BAD ENOUGH. GANS WOULD REQUIRE
MANUAL ACTUATION. POSSIBLE LOSS OF SUBSEQUENT MISSIONS IF OTHER
SIDE FAILS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/22/86 C-f10
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/26/86
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 218
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
QD-FIXED HALF
FAILED CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) FSS
2) PNEUMATIC SUBSYSTEM
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: 3/3
POST-OPS: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
SIDE A OR B
CAUSES: DEBRIS, GALLING OF POPPET
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSS OF RECHARGE SIDE IF LEAK BAD ENOUGH. GANS WOULD REQUIRE
_-_AL ACTUATION.LOSSOF SUBSEQUE_MISSIONSIF OTHERSID_
FAILS.
REFERENCES:
m
mm
m
mm
i
ms
mm
I
T_
mm
I
I
mm
J
i
= =
mm
I
mm
REPORT DATE 11/22/86 C-lll
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/26/86
MMU
219
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT :
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GAS ACTUATED NUTS (4)
FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) FSS
2) PNEUMATIC SUBSYSTEM
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
_ FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: 3/3
POST-OPS: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
SIDE A OR B
CAUSES: SEGMENT BINDING, PISTON BINDING/GALLING, O-RING FAILURE,
SPRING FAILURE, STRIPPED THREADS, UNDERTEMP
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
GANS ARE BACKUP TO FSS/PLSS LATCHES. LOSS OF MORE THAN ONE GAN
MAY ALLOW DAMAGE TO MMU DURING ENTRY BUT HAS NO IMPACT ON MMU
MISSION.
"IR" BECAUSE IF THEY FAIL DURING ENTRY, ESPECIALLY AN ABORT OR
OTHER HARD LANDING, MMU MAY FREE ITSELF FROM THE FSS AND
CONSTITUTE A DANGER TO THE CREW AS IT ROLLS AROUND THE PLB.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/22/86 C-I12
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/26/86
MMU
220
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GAS ACTUATED NUTS (4)
FAIL CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) FSS
2) PNEUMATIC SUBSYSTEM
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 2/2
OPS: 3/3
POST-OPS: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
SIDE A OR B
CAUSES: SEGMENT BINDING, PISTON BINDING, GALLED THREADS,
UNDERTEMP
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ......
MISSION TERMINATION DUE TO EMU STUCK IN STATION. (TOOL NOW
AVAILABLE TO BACK BOLTS OUT/IN).
REFERENCES:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
I
I
D
I
M
B
J
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m
I
REPORT DATE I1/22/86 C-ll3
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/26/86
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 221
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
ITEM: FILTER
FAILURE MODE: LEAK
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) FSS
2) PNEUMATIC SUBSYSTEM
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: 3/3
POST-OPS: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
SIDE A OR B
CAUSES: SEAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LARGE LEAK WILL FORCE SHUTDOWN OF SIDE AND DEFICIENT RE_GE.
SHUTDOWN OF BOTH SIDES PREVENTS MMU RECHARGE AND SUBSEQUENT
MISSIONS.
=
REFERENCES:
w
E
REPORT DATE i1/22/86 C-I14
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
9126186
MMU
222
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FILTER
FRACTURE
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) FSS
2) PNEUMATIC SUBSYSTEM
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/2R
OPS: 3/3
POST-OPS: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
SIDE A OR B
CAUSES: EMBRITTELMENT DUE TO UNDERTEMP
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DEBRIS PRODUCED MAY CAUSE_FU_TIQNQF coMPQNENT$ IN REMAI_ER
OF SIDE IF REDUNDANT FILTER ELEMENTS WERE TO ALSO FAIL. SUCH A
SCERNAIO WILL IMPACT SUBSEQUENT MISSIONS. MAY CAUSE
RECHARGE/VENT VALVES ON FSS TO CLOG DUE TO DEBRIS,
OR OTHER FILTER VALVES 0R--REGULATOR IN MMU P_UMATIC SUBSYSTEMS
TO MALFUNCTION, FAILING OPEN OR CLOSED. OR
CLOSED
REFERENCES:
w
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REPORT DATE 11/22/86 C-i15
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/26/86
MMU
223
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GAN HEATERS
OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) FSS
2) ELECTRICAL SUBSYSTEM
3) GAN 1-4
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: 3/3
POST-OPS: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: SHORT, OPEN CIRCUIT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
GAN MAY MALFUNCTION WITH LOSS OF HEATER, BUT BOLT CAN BE MANUALLY
OPERATED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/22/86 C-I16
I_EPE_ENT ORBITER ASSESSME_
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM _ALYSIS WORKS_ET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/26/86 HIG_ST CRITI_ITY _W/FUNC
MMU
224 FLIG_: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
_ATER FOR FSS RE_GE SYSTEM P_U_TIC FILTER
FAIL OPEN, SHORT CIRCUIT
LE_ _YST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS L_: G. _FFAELLI
BR_DOWNHIE__:
I) FSS
2) ELECTRI_ SUBSYSTEM
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
_ITI_LITIES
FLIG_ P_SE _W/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: 3/3
POST-OPS: 3/3
REDU_CY S_EENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LO_TION:
P_T _MBER:
SIDE A OR B
_USES: _T_I_ FAILURE OF CO_A_S-_CT_E DEBRIS
EFFECTS/_TION_E:
IF _TER FAILS, FILTER MY BECO_ EMBRITTLED _ _CTURE U_ER
PRESSURIZATION IMPULSE. REQUIRES DOWNSTREAM FAILURE FOR MISSION
IMPACTS.
RE_RENCES:
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
D
m
1
W
1
1
1
1
1B
l
1
mm
m
l
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/26/86
MMU
225
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TOGGLE VALVE HEATERS
OPEN CIRCUIT, SHORT CIRCUIT
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) FSS
2) ELECTRICAL SUBSYSTEM
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
s)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: 3/3
POST-OPS: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: SIDE A OR B
PART NUMBER:
B[P] C [P]
CAUSES: MATERIAL FAILURE OF CONTACTS-FRACTURE DEBRIS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
TOGGLE VALVE MAY FAIL TQ OPE_TE. USE OTHER SIDE FQR RECHARGE.
TERMINATION OF SUBSEQUENT MISSIONS IF BOTH SIDES FAILED.
REFERENCES:
=
w
=
=
REPORT DATE 11/22/86 C-i18
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/26/86
MMU
226
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT :
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PRESSURE GUAGE HEATERS
FAIL OPEN, SHORT CIRCUIT
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) FSS
2) ELECTRICAL SUBSYSTEM
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: 3/3
POST-OPS: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: SIDE A OR B
PART NUMBER:
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: MATERIAL FAILURE OF CONTACTS-FRACTURE DEBRIS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PRESSURE GUAGE MAy MA__FUNCT!QN. NO IMPACTS.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
u
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REFERENCES:
m
I
mm
mm
REPORT DATE 11/22/86 C-ll9
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/26/86
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 227
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
QD HEATERS
FAIL OFF, OPEN CIRCUIT, SHORT CIRCUIT
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) FSS
2) ELECTRICAL SUBSYSTEM
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: 3/3
POST-OPS: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
SIDE A OR B
CAUSES: MATERIAL FAILURE OF C0NTACTS-FRACTURE DEBRIS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
QD MAY FAiL CAUSING LOSS OF ONE RECHARGE SIDE. LOSS OF BOTH SIDES
INHIBITS PERFORMACE OF SUBSEQUENT MISSIONS.
REFERENCES:
E
u
REPORT DATE 11/22/86 C-120
i
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/26/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 228 FLIGHT: 3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HEATER THERMOSTATS
FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
mm
mm
m
m
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) FSS
2) ELECTRICAL SUBSYSTEM
3)
4)
5) n
6)
7)
8) i
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: 3/3
POST-OPS: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
SYSTEM A OR BLOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: MATERIAL FAILURE OF C0NTACTS-FRACTURE, THERMAL CYCLING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
HEATED COMPONENTS (QDs) MAY FAIL DUE TO UNDERTEMP.
OFSUBSEQUENT MISS_0_S:_OTH_QDs-ARE_FA_ ......
POSSIBLE LOSS
g
i
D
REFERENCES: m_
I
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mm
REPORT DATE i1/22/86 C-121
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/26/86
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 229
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM: HEATER THERMOSTATS
FAILURE MODE: FAIL CLOSED
HDW/FUNC
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) FSS
2) ELECTRICAL SUBSYSTEM
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
-_ _ I_CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: 3/3
POST-OPS: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] c[p]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER :
SYSTEM A OR B
CAUSES: CONTIMNATION, CONTACTS-FRACTURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
HEATED COMPONENTS MAY FAIL DUE TO OVERTEMP. NO CRITICAL IMPACTS.
REFERENCES:
v
m
REPORT DATE 11/22/86 C-122
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/26/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 230 FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TOGGLE VALVE TEMP. SENSORS
LOSS OF SIGNAL
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) FSS
2) ELECTRICAL SUBSYSTEM
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: 3/3
POST-OPS: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: ELECTRICAL OPEN ......._....
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF TEMP. INDICATION; MISSION CONTINUES. NO IMPACTS.
REFERENCES:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
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REPORT DATE 11/22/86 C-123
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/26/86
MMU
231
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TOGGLE VALVE TEMP. SENSORS
FAIL HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) FSS
2) ELECTRICAL SUBSYSTEM
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: 3/3
POST-OPS: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: MATERIAL FAILURE (CHEMICAL ABSORBTION-OZONE)
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FALSE HIGH READING; MISSION CONTINUES. NO IMPACT.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
REFERENCES:
w
r
REPORT DATE 11/22/86 C-124
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/26/86
MMU
232
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TOGGLE VALVE TEMP. SENSORS
FAIL LOW
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
FSS
ELECTRICAL SUBSYSTEM
A OR B TEMP SENSORS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: 3/3
POST-OPS: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LO_TION:
PART NUMBER :
CAUSES : MATERIAL FAILURE (CHEMICAL ABSORBTION-OZONE )
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FALSE LOW READING; MISSION CONTINUES.
mm
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REFERENCES:
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ms
l
F_
i
i
W
w
w
W
E
w
L
F
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/26/86
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 233
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ORBITER POWER CONNECTOR
FAIL OPEN (I OR MORE PINS)
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) FSS
2) ELECTRICAL SUBSYSTEM
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: 3/3
POST-OPS: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[F]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: DEBRIS, PIN FAILURE DUE TO MISALIGNMENT OR FRACTURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PARTIAL OR ALLHEATER POWER TO FSSIMMU _ ALL
TEMPE_TURE SENSOR 0UTPUT_-HEATED COMPO_ENTSHAY FAIL. MISSION
CONTINUES; SOME THERMAL CONDITIONING MAY BE REQUIRED.
: i = ":i Z
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/22/86 C-126
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/26/86
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 234
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EXTERNAL POWER LINE/CONNECTOR
OPEN CIRCUIT
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) FSS
2) ELECTRICAL SUBSYSTEM
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: 3/3
POST-OPS: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: DEBRIS IN CONNECTOR, DAMAGED PIN/INSULTATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FULL OR PARTIAL LOSS OF HEATER POWER TO MMU AND/OR MMU
TEMPERATURE "SENSOR OUTPUT" FROM MMU IS RESULT OF CONNECTOR
FAILURE. MISSION CONTINUES; THERMAL PRECONDITIONING MAY BE
REQUIRED.
REFERENCES:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
U
mm
I
I
mm
i
m
i
m
m
m
m
mm
mm
g
mm
m
mm
l
REPORT DATE 11/22/86 C-127
m
m
ri
z
w
w
L_
w
=
m
= .
ii.
r
f_
m
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/26/86
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 235
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
ITEM: ORBITER ADAPTOR BEAM MOUNTS (6)
FAILURE MODE: FRACTURE
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) FSS
2) STRUCTURES
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITIC3tLITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/IR
OPS: 3/IR
POST-OPS: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: MATERIAL FAILURE DUE TO FATIGUE OR THERMAL CYCLING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ONE BOLT IS TOLERABLE. LOSS OF ALL BOLTS CAUSES
SEPARATION OF FSS FROM ORBITER; POSSIBLE DAMAGE TO ORBITER DURING
ASCENT OR ENTRY.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/22/86 C-128
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/26/86
MMU
237
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BACKBEAM SHOCK MOUNTS (4)
SPLITTING, FRACTURING
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI _
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) FSS
2) STRUCTURES
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/2R
OPS: 3/2R
POST-OPS: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: MECHANICAL FAILURE, UNDERTEMP, CHEMICAL ATTACK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ............
LOSS OF SHOCK ISOLATION ALLOWS TRANSMISSION OF VIBRATION TO
FSS/MMU RESULTING IN POSSIBLE D_GE TO AND LOSS OF FSS/MMUFOR
MISSION OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/26/86
MMU
238
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FOOT RESTRAINT ADJUST
JAM UNLOCKED
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) FSS
2) MECHANISM
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: 3/3
POST-OPS: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] c[p]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: GALLING, DEBRIS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
MISSION CONTINUES WITH OR WITHOUT FOOT/RESTRAINT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE ii<22/86 C-130
HDW/FUNC
3/3
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9126186
MMU
239
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT :
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FOOT RESTRAINT ADJUST
JAM LOCKED
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) FSS
2) MECHANISM
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: 3/3
POST-OPS: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: GALLING, DEBRIS ....... _
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
MISSION CONTINUES WITH OR WITHOUT FOOT/RESTRAINT.
REFERENCES:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/26/86
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 240
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MMU LATCH
JAM OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) FSS
2) MECHANISM
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: 3/3
POST-OPS: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
SIDE A OR B
CAUSES: DEBRIS, MATERIAL GALLING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LAUNCH RESTRAINT BOLTS (GANS) BACKUP LATCHES.
REQUIRES MMU STRAPDOWN IN MIDDECK.
LOSS OF GANS ALSO
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/26/86
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 241
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MMU LATCH
JAM CLOSED
HDW/FUNC
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) FSS
2) MECHANISM
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: 3/3
POST-OPS: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B C P ] c[p]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
SIDE A OR B
CAUSES: DEBRIS, MATERIAL GALLING ...............
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RELEASED/DISENGAGED MANUALLY. BACKED UPBY GAS ACTUATED NUTS.
LATCH JAMMED CLOSED PREVENTS MMU FROM BEING RELEASED FROM FSS.
LATCH CAN BE OVERRIDDEN MANUALLY IF NECESARY, WHICH DISABLES
LATCH.
GAS ACTUATED NUTS WOULD THEN BE ENGAGED TO SECURE MMU IN FSS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/22/86 C-133
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/26/86
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 242
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MUSHROOM KNOBS (8)
FRACTURE
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) FSS
2) STRUCTURE
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITIC3tLITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: 3/3
POST-OPS: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: LEFT AND RIGHT SIDE RAILS
PART NUMBER:
C [ P ]
CAUSES: MATERIAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT; MISSIONCONTINUES.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/22/86 C-134
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/26/86
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 243
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
THERMAL BLANKETS
FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) FSS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: 3/3
POST-OPS: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: VELCRO RELEASE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
QD'S OR RECHARGE SYSTEM VALVES _Y _FUN__ION_0M THERMA L_
EXPOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF RECHARGE AND SUBSEQUENT MISSION
CAPABILITY.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/26/86
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 244
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TETHER REEL RESTRAINT
FRACTURE
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) FSS
2) STRUCTURES
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
S)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: 3/3
POST-OPS: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: RIGHT OR LEFT SIDERAIL
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: MATERIAL FAILURE DUE TO THERMAL CYCLING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
MISSION CONTINUES WITH OR WITHOUT RESTRAINT.
REFERENCES:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
w
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/26/86
MMU
245
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TETHER REEL RESTRAINT
DEFORMATION
LEAD ANALYST: P. BAILEY SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) FSS
2) STRUCTURES
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
..............._ITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: 3/3
POST-OPS: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
RIGHT OR LEFT SIDERAIL
CAUSES: THERMAL CYCLING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
MISSION CONTINUES WITH OR WITHOUT RESTRAINT.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
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ID CRIT ITEM
APPENDIX D
POTENTIAL CRITICAL ITEMS
FAILURE MODE
L--
m
w
w
169 i/i THC
170 I/i THC
171 i/I RHC
172 I/I RHC
173 I/i THC ISOLATE SWITCH
i00 2/IR GN2 TANK
105 2/IR ISOLATION VALVE
106 2/IR GN2 LINES
ii0 2/IR THRUSTER MANIFOLD
iii 2/IR THRUSTER MANIFOLD
112 2/IR THRUSTER
113 2/IR THRUSTER
114 2/IR THRUSTER
116 2/IR GN2 REGULATOR
117 2/IR GN2 REGULATOR
120 2/IR GN2 RELIEF VALVE
122 2/IR PRESSURE GAGE
127 2/IR GN2 TEST PORT
128 2/IR BATTERY
129
131
132
133
134
136
138
142
152
154
158
159
160
161
164
166
167
168
182
2/1R INTERNAL/EXTERNAL POWER SW
2/IR INTERNAL/EXTERNAL POWER SW
2/IR TERMINAL BOARD
2/IR TERMINAL BOARD .........
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
2/1R
2/1R
2/IR
MAIN POWER SWITCH
LTS/HTR.cb
CEA CIRCUIT BREAKER
VDA cb
CEA POWER SWITCH
CEA POWER SWITCH
CONTROL ELECTRONICS ASSY
CONTROL ELECTRONICS ASSY
CONTROL ELECTRONICS ASSY
CONTROL ELECTRONICS ASSY
ISOLATION VALVE TIMER
VALVE DRIVER AMPLIFIER
VALVE DRIVER AMPLIFIER
VALVE DRIVER AMPLIFIER
CEA PWR SPLY
FAIL ON 1-3 AXES
FAIL OFF 1-3 AXES
FAIL ON (i-3 AXES)
FAIL OFF (i-3 AXES)
FAIL ON
LEAK
FAIL CLOSE
LEAK
LEAK
CONSTRICTION
FAIL OPEN
FAIL CLOSED
LEAK
FAIL CLOSED
FAIL OPEN
FAIL OPEN
LEAK
LEAK
NO OUTPUT - LOW
OUTPUT
FAIL OPEN
FAIL TO EXTERNAL
POSITION
SHORT
FAIL OPEN
FAIL OFF
FAIL OPEN
FAIL OPEN
FAIL OPEN
FAIL ON IN ISO.
FAIL OFF
FAIL ON 1-12 CH.
FAIL OFF 1-12 CH.
NOISY OUTPUT
LOGIC FAILURE
FAILS ON
FAIL OFF
FAIL ON
NOISY
FAIL HIGH OR LOW,
GREATER THAN 5. IV,
LESS THAN 4.9V
D-I
MDAC
ID CRIT ITEM
APPENDIX D
POTENTIAL CRITICAL ITEMS
FAILURE MODE
I
I
183 2/IR WIRE HARNESS
186 2/IR
196 2/IR
206 2/IR
103 2/2
104 2/2
119 2/2
125 2/2
130 2/2
HEATERS
PLSS LATCHES .......
BACKUP PLSS LATCHES
(LAP BELTS)
TOGGLE VALVE
ISOLATION VALVE
GN2 REGULATOR
RECHARGE QUICK DISCONNECT
INTERNAL/EXTERNAL POWER SW
135 2/2_ _ MAIN POWER SWITCH
162 2/2 ...... ISOLATION V_VE_TIM_.ER
163 2/2 ISOLATION VALVE TIMER
174 2/2 THC ISOLATE SWITCH
175 2/2 AUTOMATIC ATTITUDE HOLD SW
177 2/2 ALTERNATE CONTROL MODES SW
184 2/2 EXTERNAL POWER CONNECTOR
185
190
191
192
194
195
198
2/2 HEATERS ....
2/2 ARM LENGTH ADJUST
2/2 ARM LENGTH ADJUST
2/2 ARM LENGTH ADJUST
2/2 .... _XTERNAL POWER CONNECTOR
2/2 EXTERNAL POWER CONNECTOR
2/2 MMU BATTERY LATCHES
200 2/2
201 2/2
203 2/2
207 2/2
220 2/2
197 3/2R
222 3/2R
BACKUP ARM LATCH
BACKUP ARM LATCH
BATTERY THERMAL COVER
BACKUP PLSS LATCHES
GAS ACTUATED NUTS (4)
PLSS LATCHES
FILTER
SHORT OR OPEN
CIRCUIT
FAIL ON (CEA)
FAIL OPEN
FAIL OPEN DURING
FLIGHT
FAIL CLOSED
FAIL OPEN
FAIL LOW
FAIL OPEN/LEAK
FAIL TO INTERNAL
POSITION
FAIL ON
FAIL OFF
TOO SHORT
FAIL OFF
FAIL ON
FAIL OFF
FAIL OPEN, 1 OR
MORE PINS
FAIL OFF _
FAIL UNLATCHED
FAIL LATCHED SHORT
FAIL LATCHED LONG
FAIL CONNECTED
FAIL DISCONNECTED
FAIL UNLAT_D
FAIL_, _TCHED
FAIL LATCHED
FAIL UNLATCHED
FAIL OPEN DURING
STOWAGE
FAIL CLOSED
FAIL CLOSED
FAIL CLOSED
FRACTURE
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